NOTE

This Microfiche meets the quality requirements of the American National Standard for Microfiche of Documents (ANSI PH5.9-1975). However, because of imperfections in the document from which it was made, it contains images that are illegible or difficult to read. The source document for this microfiche is the best copy that could be obtained prior to filming.

CIS Congressional Information Service, Inc
Washington, D.C.

99th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - Senate Document 99-11

THE SUPERPOWERS AT A CROSSROADS: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1985

REPORT

BY A

SENATE DELEGATION TO HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET UNION

LED BY

SENATORS ROBERT C. BYRD AND STROM THURMOND

AUGUST 27-SEPTEMBER 6, 1985

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

52-762 O WASHINGTON : 1985

S920-7

SENATE DELEGATION TO HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET UNION

August 27–September 6, 1985

ROBERT C. BYRD, *Delegation Chairman*, West Virginia
STROM THURMOND, *Delegation Vice-Chairman*, South Carolina
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
SAM NUNN, Georgia
PAUL SARBANES, Maryland
DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona
JOHN WARNER, Virginia
GEORGE MITCHELL, Maine

STAFF

DAVID J. PRATT, *Secretary for the Minority*
C. RICHARD D'AMATO, *Counsel and Deputy Staff Director*,
Democratic Policy Committee
DENNIS W. SHEDD, *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*,
Committee on the Judiciary
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, *Minority Staff Director*,
Committee on Foreign Relations
ARNOLD L. PUNARO, *Minority Staff Director*,
Committee on Armed Services
MS. BARBARA VIDENIEKS, *Executive Director*,
Office of the Democratic Leader
MS. LINDA PEEK, *Communications Director*,
Democratic Policy Committee
PETER D. LENNON, *Democratic Policy Committee*
KEVIN NEALER, *Democratic Policy Committee*
ROBERT G. BELL, *Committee on Armed Services*
MS. CHRISTINA LOESCHER, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD	v
A. Setting, and Purposes, and Summary of the Delegation's Trip	1
B. Visit to Hungary	5
C. Visit to the Soviet Union	11
a. The Ukraine	11
b. Moscow	11
Key Issues and Meetings	11
i. Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures	11
Meeting with Senior Soviet Military Officers	17
ii. Human Rights	21
iii. Economic and Trade Issues	23
Meeting with Soviet Trade Officials	23
iv. Meeting of Delegation with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev	25
Impressions of Mr. Gorbachev	31
D. Conclusions and Recommendations	32

APPENDICES

A. Text of the Communique Agreed to in Geneva by Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, January 8, 1985, and Statement by Secretary Shultz	36
B. Departure Statement, Andrews Air Force Base, August 27, 1985	38
C. Arrival Statement and Press Conference in Moscow, August 31, 1985	39
D. Meeting at Defense Ministry with Senior Soviet Military Officers, September 2, 1985	41
E. Delegation's Statements to Mr. Gorbachev, September 3, 1985, and outline of Nuclear Risk Reduction Proposal	47
F. Letters regarding human rights matters presented to Mr. Gorbachev by the delegation	57
G. Transcript of Press Conference at Spaso House, Moscow, September 3, 1985	60
H. Text of Senate Resolution 227 urging a joint United States-Soviet effort to achieve worldwide disease immunization by 1990	71

FOREWORD

SEPTEMBER 25, 1985.

During the last eight months, a number of developments have occurred which raise the possibility of significant changes in the Soviet-American relationship. First, arms control negotiations on Space, Strategic, and Intermediate-range nuclear forces resumed on March 12, 1985, in Geneva, after a hiatus of some 15 months. Two rounds of those talks have now been completed, with the third and final round of the year having gotten underway on September 19, 1985. Second, a new, younger, and more dynamic leadership, under the direction of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, is now firmly in place in Moscow. Third, President Reagan and the new Soviet leader have agreed to meet at the summit from November 19–20 in Geneva, the first such meeting between our two nations' leaders since 1979. The recent period has been one of unusually active private and public diplomacy on the part of both superpowers, raising expectations that movement on a variety of questions which have separated the two nations may now be more possible than during the last few years.

Against this background, Senator Robert C. Byrd, the Democratic Leader, formed a bipartisan delegation of 8 Senators to travel to the Soviet Union and Hungary August 27–September 6, 1985, to assess the prospects for progress in Soviet-American relations, and to meet personally with General Secretary Gorbachev.

The first stop on this trip was London, where the delegation met with The Honorable Malcolm Rifkin, M.P., and Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who had participated in the meetings that were held in April between Mr. Gorbachev and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Mr. Rifkin provided valuable insights and impressions of the new Soviet leader and the British view of current Soviet policies and strategies.

En route to Moscow, the delegation visited Hungary and met with a number of officials of the top Hungarian leadership. During extensive discussions with them, important insights were obtained from the perspective of a Soviet ally that also has had some success in pursuing a rather creative domestic economic policy, an ally that may be able to act as a bridge between East and West.

The Soviet portion of this trip began with a 2-day visit to the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev, where the delegation was officially hosted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Mr. Gorbachev has recently been traveling extensively outside Moscow, and has focused on the need for economic reform in preparation for the 27th party Congress, which will be held in Moscow in February 1986. The delegation felt it was useful to gain a perspective on the impact that Mr. Gorbachev's strategy has had in the key economic province of the Ukraine. From Kiev, the group proceeded to Moscow, where a

A. Setting, Purposes, and Summary of the Delegation's Visit

The delegation's visit to the Soviet Union came at a particularly propitious time in the development of Soviet-American relations, when movement on a variety of questions may be more possible than during the recent past. The past few years have been unproductive in terms of the Soviet-American dialogue and of specific aspects of the relationship along a broad front, ranging from consular arrangements to technical exchanges to arms control. There has been a marked increase in tensions and a high level of rhetoric. The result has been an increasing potential for fundamental misunderstandings between the two nations.

However, our two nations now are in a position of significant opportunity. A new, younger, and more dynamic leadership appears firmly in place in Moscow, after several years in which the senior leadership in the Soviet Politburo was beset by illness and an apparent inability to make bold decisions on both international and domestic policy issues. In addition, the arms control talks underway in Geneva, the meeting on September 27th between the President and the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the November 19-20th summit meeting—all provide a framework and opportunity for progress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

This potential for progress in the relationship between our two great nations, however, will depend, in no small measure, upon the willingness of both sides to move beyond polemics, which have characterized the past few years.

The delegation was composed of several Senators who have leadership positions in the U.S. Senate on many of the matters comprising the U.S.-Soviet relationship: Robert C. Byrd, the Senate Democratic Leader and a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, was the delegation chairman; Strom Thurmond, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the ranking Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was the vice chairman; Claiborne Pell, Ranking Democratic Member of the Senate Relations Committee; Sam Nunn, Ranking Democratic Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Paul S. Sarbanes, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Dennis DeConcini, Senate Appropriations Committee; John W. Warner, Chairman of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and former Secretary of the Navy; and George J. Mitchell, Senate Finance Committee. Most members of the delegation were travelling to the U.S.S.R. for the second or third time.

In Moscow, the delegation engaged in lengthy discussions with the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, with senior military officers of the Headquarters of the Soviet armed forces, Admiral N.N. Amel'ko, assistant chief of the Headquarters, and Col.-Gen. N.F. Chervov, Chief of Directorate of

the Headquarters and the U.S.S.R.'s most public military spokesman on arms control matters; with leaders of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; and with senior officials at the Soviet Ministry of Trade.

The delegation benefited from the insights of the Charge d'Affaires of our embassy in Moscow, Mr. Richard Combs, and his country team, who provided an excellent briefing on U.S.-Soviet issues, and invaluable assistance throughout the visit.

The general purpose of the delegation's visit to the Soviet Union was to engage in substantive discussions with high-ranking party and government officials on the broad subjects of arms control, East-West relations, and trade. The delegation was interested in attempting to assess the state of the recent changes in the Soviet leadership, and the flexibility and general attitudes of this new leadership toward improvement in the general relationship with the United States.

More specifically, the delegation had the following objectives in making its journey and in meeting with the General Secretary Gorbachev:

(1) Help create an atmosphere for a productive November summit and for progress at the third round of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva;

(2) Provide the unique institutional perspective of the U.S. Senate, and the individual perspectives of leading U.S. Senators, on many of the issues which are, or should be, the subject of continuing discussions and decisions by both nations;

(3) Communicate the President's serious intent in approaching the summit;

(4) Indicate the basic unity of purpose among Americans and between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch on national security and arms control issues—especially in the areas of verification and compliance and of insistance that any arms control agreements be mutual and equitable;

(5) Listen to General Secretary Gorbachev's views and perspectives and carry those back to the President to help prepare him for the Summit and to help prepare our negotiators for the third round of arms talks in Geneva;

(6) Appraise General Secretary Gorbachev's personal leadership style and approach toward managing U.S.-Soviet relations;

(7) Broaden General Secretary Gorbachev's understanding of the American political process, particularly the role of public opinion and the Senate in the treaty process;

(8) Highlight the importance of the Geneva arms control negotiations and the need for the Soviets to present, in that forum, detailed and specific proposals rather than continue their pattern of informally suggesting, in other settings or through third parties, positive-sounding proposals which are not followed up by their negotiators at Geneva; and

(9) Discuss the Nunn-Warner proposal for the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and explore the possibility of resuming the Navy-to-Navy talks pursuant to the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement of 1972.

In preparing for its trip, the delegation was aware that this is an important watershed period in our relationship with the Soviet

Union, which may well set the tone for U.S.-Soviet relations for many years to come. The delegation through its chairman, consulted with President Reagan and former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter; Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger; National Security advisor McFarlane; the Chief Arms Control Negotiator for the Geneva talks, Ambassador Max Kampelman; Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige; and other senior administration officers of the National Security Council, State and Commerce Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Also consulted were former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger and Harold Brown; former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance; former National Security Advisor Zbigneiw Brzezinski; former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon; and Dr. Dmitri Simes, professional lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the "Helsinki" Commission, also provided timely assistance and information.

The delegation did not go as negotiators, in recognition of the Constitutional division of responsibilities between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The delegation was also determined that the Soviets would not achieve anything which could undercut the U.S.'s capable negotiators in Geneva. The delegation's experiences in Moscow and Kiev served to reinforce the conclusion that there are wide divergences in the predispositions, backgrounds, and perceptions of both sides which pose substantial obstacles—not only to easy and rapid agreement in areas of mutual interest but also, and even more fundamentally, to effective continuing communication between the two countries. It remains unclear whether the new General Secretary is in the process of forming new attitudes and opinions about the United States, and the desirability of reaching agreements with our nation, or whether he already has reached hardened conclusions. An opportunity may exist to have some impact on those attitudes and opinions if the American message is delivered with an understanding that the Soviet Union is sensitive to its need to be recognized as a military superpower equal of the United States.

There are not as yet any definite indications that Soviet positions on any substantive foreign policy matters have shifted, but there are clear differences in the style of the Gorbachev leadership from that of its predecessors. There is a new sense of self-confidence which makes Mr. Gorbachev a formidable negotiating partner, whose skills at organizing his arguments and presenting them were demonstrated convincingly.

The new confidence of the Soviet leadership also appears to be resulting in a new assertiveness and sophistication in the public marketing of their positions. They recently have mounted a series of public relations initiatives seemingly designed to put them on the offensive vis-a-vis the U.S., in NATO, and in the Third World, and to position Mr. Gorbachev favorably for the upcoming summit. The delegation noted first-hand a demonstration of the public relations skills of the new Soviet leader, when the publication of his cover-story interview with Time Magazine was released the very same day the delegation arrived in Moscow. It was clear that Mr. Gorbachev arranged his interview with Time maganize to coincide

with the delegation's visit and to serve as a backdrop for the meetings which ensued. The interview did provide a springboard for the delegation to comment upon and to probe further into the developing Soviet positions on the contentious issues between our two nations. The Soviet multifaceted public diplomacy campaign also included placing an extensive advertisement in The New York Times, on August 13, 1985, blaming the lack of progress in Geneva on the United States; issuing glossy pamphlets in five languages condemning the SDI program; announcing proposals for a nuclear testing moratorium and a new United Nations conference banning the militarization of space; and making contacts with, and sending letters to, private groups in the U.S. posing attractive-sounding but generalized ideas on arms control.

While the delegation believes that progress in arms control agreements with the Soviet Union can only be built upon serious negotiations at the conference table, it is concerned that the United States is lagging behind the U.S.S.R. in the competition for supporting public opinion. The media campaign being waged by the Soviet Union necessitates that the United States formulate and implement no less vigorously its own campaign of public diplomacy between now and the summit meeting in November. This campaign must be backed up by sound and flexible U.S. positions on key issues.

Of the meetings in the Soviet Union, the delegation found that the most useful were those held with General Secretary Gorbachev and at the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Trade. Summaries and impressions of those meetings follow, along with the delegation's recommendations arising from its visit. A description of the delegation's activities regarding human rights in the Soviet Union also follows.

OFFICIAL DELEGATION MEETINGS

London

The Honorable Malcolm Rifkin, Member of Parliament and Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Budapest

Ferenc Havasi, Party Secretary and Politburo Member;
Jozsef Marjai, Deputy Premier;
Peter Varkony, Foreign Minister;
Matya Szuros, Secretary to the Central Committee.

Kiev

Yuriy Georgiyevich Bakhtin, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine.

Moscow

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;

A.E. Voss, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;

Admiral N.N. Amel'ko, Assistant Chief of the Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces;

Colonel General N.F. Chervov, Chief of Directorate of the Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces;
N.D. Komarov, Deputy Minister of Trade.

B. Visit to Hungary

U.S.-Soviet Issues

The delegation's brief visit to Budapest August 28–30, provided an occasion to meet with Hungarian leaders, obtain their impressions of the new Soviet leadership, and assess the implications of that change in leadership for other Warsaw Pact members. The delegation had lengthy, frank, and valuable discussions with Party Secretary and Politburo Member Ferenc Havasi, Deputy Premier Jozsef Marjai, Foreign Minister Peter Varkony, and Secretary to the Central Committee Matyas Szuros. The delegation is very appreciative of the outstanding efforts on the part of our able ambassador to Hungary, Mr. Nicolas Salgo, the deputy chief of mission, Mr. Keith Smith, and the rest of our highly professional country team, in making its visit productive and enlightening.

In Hungary, arms control issues were a focus secondary to trade and other bilateral and East-West topics. However, as a Warsaw pact ally of the Soviet Union, Hungary has particular interests in any arms control agreements affecting the strategic and intermediate range nuclear balance and conventional force levels and operations in Central Europe. Hungary's unique political and economic situation also has encouraged its leaders to consider whether the country can contribute to the improvement of overall relations between the superpowers by serving as a "bridge" between the East and West. Hungary blends support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union with reforms in the domestic economic arena.

Hungary's leadership also is considered to have the best understanding and insights into the leadership changes underway in the U.S.S.R. since the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982. Therefore, the delegation probed the perspectives of the Hungarian leadership as to prospects for reaching arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and the implications of such agreements for Eastern Europe.

Foreign Minister Varkony characterized U.S.-Hungarian relations as being without significant problems, and developing correctly and well, despite deterioration in the international situation. He asked for favorable consideration for extending multi-year treatment for Most Favored Nation trade status to Hungary instead of the current annual review of that status.

Mr. Varkony went on to characterize the upcoming summit as a positive development. He expressed hope that the face-to-face meeting would help the two leaders to understand one another better, and that they might agree on certain themes or manners of conduct in the overall relationship. He welcomed this as an important change from the current, dangerous confrontational state of affairs, and said he has hopeful that concrete improvements in the bilateral relationship were possible. On the subject of arms control Mr. Varkony expressed hope that an understanding was possible. He felt that a new impetus at the summit could yield positive results for Europe.

Mr. Varkony assured the delegation that the new Soviet leadership was serious in its wish for meaningful arms control, but would not give in to pressures which would affect the prestige of the Soviet Union. If the United States wishes to look for face-saving solutions whereby both powers protect their interests, Mr. Varkony felt the U.S. should meet the Soviet leadership with a pragmatic, cooperative approach, Mr. Varkony said that, as an on-looker, he saw the Soviets as offering unilateral steps such as the testing moratorium, and the West only being confrontational. Mr. Varkony said that the summit should proceed in a business-like manner. He said that the grass, such as Hungary, gets trampled when the elephants fight.

Similar sentiments were expressed in the delegation's meeting with Party Secretary Havasi, the senior architect of Hungarian economic development and advisor to Janos Kadar, the Hungarian leader. Mr. Havasi gave the delegation a brief overview of Hungarian political and economic developments since the war. But he went on to make some important observations on the opportunity for improving superpower relations. Mr. Havasi said that the Hungarians had great hopes for the approaching 27th Party Congress in the Soviet Union. He characterized the current expectations by saying that the whole socialist world is standing before a very significant and qualitative change. He said there were new concepts of management, a clearer notion of reality, and the opportunity for improved relations and better cooperation. He cited upcoming party congresses in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Poland as occasions for important policy directions for socialist countries. He expressed his belief that this was a good time to seek improvements in the superpower relationship.

When asked about what could be done to shape the relationship in positive ways, and what the United States can do to influence the upcoming party congresses in a positive direction, Mr. Havasi responded that the Soviet party congress in February, 1986, after the summit will have a great influence on other party congresses next year. He also speculated that the upcoming Geneva round could produce some mitigation in the arms race, and that such progress could have an enormous influence on the party congresses. He described the next five years as a fateful period during which the international scene could be shaped for many years to come. If the arms race accelerates, the Party congresses—which review the national five-year plans—would take that into account as national priorities are set. If the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Eureka program (a French-sponsored effort to research space technologies), and similar programs by Warsaw Pact countries were pursued, it would set developments on one course. But if a few years of peace and lessening tensions could be achieved, then the nations involved would have the opportunity to carry out reforms to improve their standard of living, improve trade, and otherwise reap the benefits of greater cooperation. Just as the hard-line factions within governments benefit from war-like conditions, the progressive elements are aided by a more relaxed atmosphere.

When asked whether Mr. Havasi regarded Mr. Gorbachev as representing this more progressive element in Soviet politics, Mr. Havasi responded that his impressions were based less on personal

acquaintance and more on the experience gained in the first few months of Mr. Gorbachev's tenure. He encouraged the delegation to look at what Mr. Gorbachev has said thus far and he summarized those statements as follows:

(1) The Soviet Union is in a new phase of its development;

(2) Its economic achievements obtained so far must be defended;

(3) Socialism must exert an influence on the world economy, not just militarily;

(4) Technological advance is necessary;

(5) There is a low standard of living and it must improve; and,

(6) A new set of relationships must be worked out with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries because in many places these relationships have deteriorated.

A dogmatic approach contradicts all these elements, according to Mr. Havasi. He cited a recent speech by Soviet Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee Y.K. Ligachev, who is responsible for political ideology and personnel matters. In that speech, Mr. Ligachev urged that war be declared on formalities, self-praise, praising one another, and cronyism. He called for an end to commitment to individuals and the beginning of commitment to policy. He acknowledged that the dogmatists may be characterizing the leadership as too young and lacking an appreciation for the problems. But he felt that Mr. Gorbachev was leading the progressive forces within the party.

Asked if he felt that mitigation in the arms race was expected in one summit session, or whether more than one meeting would be needed to produce substantive results, Mr. Havasi responded that many meeting were necessary, in his view, and that a network of meetings should be established. He spoke of his own meeting with President Reagan during his recent visit to the United States in February 1985, describing the warmth and courtesy that characterized the meeting with the President. He recounted how valuable it was for him to become aquainted with the President, and how it shaped his own impressions of Mr. Reagan. Why, he asked, wouldn't a meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan do equally as much to provide those men with better impressions of one another? He pointed out that the deterioration in relations between the superpowers had taken time, and that improvement would likewise take time. Even if the summit were to be a failure, Mr. Havasi felt that its true importance existed in the personal contact and understanding that it would assure, and he urged that we not become disillusioned, because there was no alternative to continuing efforts to improve the relationship.

In a follow-up meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Marjai, the delegation heard similar observations. Mr. Marjai described Mr. Gorbachev as commensurate with the challenge of bringing the Soviet Union into a new phase in its development. He said that Mr. Gorbachev's base for ascendancy into the leadership was established when Yuri Andropov became a Secretary of the Party's Central Committee under Mr. Brezhnev. During that period and even under Konstantin Chernenko, personnel changes were made that

could be regarded as preparing the way for Mr. Gorbachev's election as General Secretary.

Mr. Marjai judged from Mr. Gorbachev's statements that he has a clear understanding of the needs of the Soviet Union at this time. And Mr. Marjai said that, from his own perspective, Mr. Gorbachev has the patience and consistency needed to move ahead and meet those needs. Mr. Marjai's own contacts with a broad variety of Soviets, and what could be sensed from Mr. Gorbachev's public statements, supported the thesis that there is broad popular support for Mr. Gorbachev's policies.

In Mr. Marjai's judgment, the central issue confronting Mr. Gorbachev is the modernization of the Soviet economy, but that desire for modernization would find expressions in other areas of Soviet society, and would benefit the whole world. He speculated that these changes would not portend basic shifts in the formal arrangements or legal framework among the Socialist nations, but as the Soviet Union makes economic advances, the environment for other Socialist countries wil necessarily improve. He described Hungary's interest in a prosperous, rapidly developing Soviet Union as going beyond ideological compatibility and as being of fundamental, material interest.

In responding to a question about the impact of Mr. Gorbachev's ascendancy on the Eastern Bloc's Economic Grouping, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), Mr. Marjai said that any such change would take some time to translate into changes in the other member states. He expressed the hope that Comecon may become a more rational organization. He said there were fundamental problems presented by the great differences among the members of Comecon in their economic systems. He noted that it may someday establish more common elements of operation, but that it is, at present, not a common market, but a group of individual markets operating together in accordance with sometimes different rules.

Prior to departure for the Soviet Union, the delegation also met with Mr. Matyas Szuros, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and Chairman of a Parliamentary foreign relations committee. Mr. Szuros provided a brief sketch of Hungary's role in European history, and shared many of the views expressed by the other Hungarian leaders with whom the delegation met about U.S.-Soviet relations and the opportunities and challenges presented by the current situation.

In particular, Mr. Szuros responded to questions about the impact of the change in Soviet leadership by pointing out that the Soviet Union was a large country, and it would be unrealistic to expect change as rapidly as it might be possible in a smaller country. He emphasized the importance of technological development in current Soviet planning, and said that increased efficiencies in the Soviet economy would be of benefit to all socialist countries.

Mr. Szuros harkened back to World War II and suggested that both superpowers should strive to achieve the kind of cooperation that existed at that time. He expressed the opinion that American democratic traditions have not found their best expression in aspects of American foreign policy—citing the Vietnam war—and he recalled the Roosevelt period as a contrast.

In reacting to a question about prospects for improving the current international political environment, Mr. Szuros anticipated no basic change in the balance of power, but identified the fundamental question as whether confrontation or detente would charaterize the superpower relationship. He urged that cooperation, not superiority, should be the goal. He expressed hope for the November summit, and agreed with other Hungarian spokesmen that the next few years will be an important formative period. He also felt that greater flexibility was important in dealing with regional issues, and that there should be better U.S.-Soviet consultations regarding the Middle East.

In a recent article entitled "Interaction of the National and the International in Hungarian Politics," Mr. Szuros posited a role for smaller nations, such as Hungary, in a world dominated by superpowers. While suggesting a modest role as an economic and political go-between, Mr. Szuros's article notes:

> In accordance with the policy of peaceful coexistence, Hungary strives to maintain mutually beneficial relations with everybody who respects our social system and our commitments to our allies. But we clearly reject every attempt aimed at subverting the relationship between Hungary and her allies, and at weakening solidarity amongst the socialist countries.

The delegation exchanged views with Mr. Szuros on this position and found his comments useful in placing previous discussions in perspective.

TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

Despite the impact of Most-Favored-Nation status, U.S.-Hungarian trade remains at a modest level. Between 1978 (when MFN was granted) and 1983, the U.S. Commerce Department reported that trade increased by 61%. Total trade turnover was $268 million. U.S. exports accounted for $110 million and U.S. imports totalled $158 million. The leading U.S. exports were agricultural commodities and equipment, machinery, chemicals, and hides. Hungarian exports included ham, buses, electrical equipment, and clothing.

The interest in expanded trade is evident on both sides, but there are serious impediments to rapid growth in the next few years. First, Hungary has reduced imports in order to improve its hard currency balance of payments. Second, although some of the import restrictions have been removed since its liquidity crisis has eased, many Hungarian goods still are not competitive in Western markets.

MFN treatment is currently extended to Hungary for one year at a time under the required waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Hungary has expressed interest in gaining multi-year MFN. Hungary has some resources which improve trade prospects, and she allows joint ownership ventures between its enterprises and foreign firms, as well as various co-production arrangements. A number of U.S. firms have established joint ventures in Hungary, and Hungary has entered into joint ownership projects in the United States. A number of U.S. firms and banks have offices in

Budapest and the Hungarian National Bank has an office in New York. With MFN status, which is renewed annually, Hungary has access to U.S. Export-Import Bank and U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation credits.

The delegation was impressed by the candid exchange of views with Hungarian leaders on matters of economic policy and trade. The current economic retrenchment in Hungary has resulted in a slower growth rate there, and there is every sign that this situation will prevail until perhaps sometime in 1986. Nonetheless, the delegation remains impressed with the economic potential of Hungary, and it believes that there are sound reasons for optimism about increased U.S.-Hungarian trade.

Hungarian leaders described their efforts to restrain their economy through wage and price adjustments. Acknowledging that these stringent policies have resulted in scaled back public expectations and some genuine hardships for the Hungarian public, government officials pointed out that primacy has been given to servicing external debt. Especially when viewed in the light of debtor nation experience in our own hemisphere, this sacrifice is most commendable. Hungarian officials demonstrated a justifiable pride in their efforts to avoid debt rescheduling.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Hungarian performance on Helsinki compliance and human rights continues to be viewed positively in comparison to the performance of most East European governments on these issues. Nevertheless, problems do arise. "The 18th Annual Report of the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (published in 1985) notes a few exceptions to the generally positive record. These include police surveillance of a prominent dissident, an expansion of police powers, and levying of stiff fines for those disseminating Samizdat (underground) literature.

Emigration problems between the U.S. and Hungary are few. The level of emigration from Hungary continues to be low, but the State Department notes that the Hungarian government has been responsive in trying to solve family reunification problems. Requests to emigrate are sometimes turned down, but there is no reported evidence that Hungary has penalized citizens for applying. Jewish emigration is very low, but members of the small Jewish community are not asking to leave in any significant numbers. Millions of Hungarians travel abroad each year, and the number of foreigners visiting Hungary annually now exceeds its total population of 10.5 million.

In each of the meetings the delegation raised the importance of continued progress on human rights issues. The delegation's expression of concern may have had a special significance at a time when Romania's Most Favored Nation trade status has been endangered by human rights problems in that country.

The importance of human rights issues was underscored by the delegation's visit to Raoul Wallenberg Square in Budapest, where Senator Pell laid a commemorative wreath in honor of Wallenberg and his efforts on behalf of thousands persecuted under the Nazis.

C. Visit to the Soviet Union

A. THE UKRAINE

On August 30, 1985, the delegation visited Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, as a prelude to its visit and meetings in Moscow. One of the largest of the Soviet republics in terms of both population and geographic area, the Ukraine also is one of the most economically important regions of the U.S.S.R.

The delegation met with members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and heard the Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, Yuriy Georgiyevich Bakhtin, outline the agricultural and economic development of the region. The Soviet official promoted the recent arms control proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev, especially the call for a nuclear testing moratorium, and he asserted that the world's Parliamentarians have a special role in promoting peaceful relations among nations.

On behalf of the delegation, Senator Byrd underscored the desire of President Reagan, the Congress and the American people for peaceful relations. He highlighted the Senate's unique role in considering proposed arms control agreements, and he pointed out that the Soviets should try to understand that this behavior in seemingly-unrelated spheres, such as Afghanistan, could influence Senate deliberations on arms control and other treaties. Senator Byrd stressed the common interest both the U.S.S.R. and the United States have in avoiding nuclear war.

During its brief stay in Kiev, the Senate delegation visited Babi Yar and laid a bouquet of flowers at the monument to the thousands of Jews and other citizens of the city who were massacred at that site by the Nazis during World War II.

B. MOSCOW

Key Issues and Meetings

i. Arms control and confidence building measures

The delegation decided at the outset of its planning for the trip that arms control issues would be a major focus of its activities. Before departing, the delegation received particularly helpful insights into the current state of our arms control relationship with the Soviet Union from the chief U.S. negotiator at the Geneva-based Nuclear and Space Arms (NST) Talks, Ambassador Max Kampelman, and from other officials of the State Department, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency. These insights complemented the expertise that members of the delegation had developed through their Senate committee assignments and leadership responsibilities. For example, two members of the delegation, Senators Pell and Nunn, are co-chairmen of the new Senate Arms Control Observer Group, and two others, Senators Byrd and Warner, are members of the Group, a body created at the suggestion of Senator Byrd in January 1985, to assist the Senate and its standing committees in discharging their responsibilities regarding proposed arms control treaties.

The delegation was sensitive to the need to refrain from intruding into the domain properly reserved for U.S. Executive Branch

52-762 O - 85 - 2

negotiators, and had no intention of being drawn into a bargaining situation with the Soviets on specific arms control proposals. Instead the delegation defined several general objectives for its discussions with Soviet officials:

(1) Help create a productive atmosphere for the then forthcoming third round of Geneva talks and for the summit;

(2) Indicate the fundamental unity of views between the Executive and Legislative Branches, and between Democrats and Republicans, on the goal of mutual and verifiable arms control agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.;

(3) Stress the great importance that both branches of government, and all Americans, attach to Soviet compliance with existing and future arms control agreements, and to the provision of adequate verification of any future arms control arrangements;

(4) Explain the special, institutional perspectives and constitutional responsibilities the Senate has in considering and providing advice and consent to the ratification of arms control treaties;

(5) Emphasize the significance of the President's decision to continue the U.S. policy of not undercutting the SALT II limits and explain the Senate's role in that decision;

(6) Urge the Soviets to show greater flexibility regarding particular U.S. arms control proposals and positions and to be more forthcoming with their own proposals at the Geneva arms control negotiations; and

(7) Understand more fully the Soviet position on the Geneva talks, and other arms control proposals they have recently given publicity.

The delegation's best opportunities to accomplish these objectives came, as expected, in its meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev and in a lengthy discussion, on the day preceding that session, with senior Soviet military officials at the Ministry of Defense.

The arms control issues between the United States and the Soviet Union cover a wide spectrum of negotiations. These range from the previously mentioned Geneva talks, which address strategic and intermediate range nuclear systems and space arms, to the Geneva chemical weapons talks, to various proposals on confidence building measures, to nuclear testing issues and to the Vienna discussions on reductions in conventional forces in Europe. While it considers all these negotiations important, the delegation decided to focus its attention on three areas it believed were either the most problematic or contained the best chances for progress at the present time. These areas were the Nuclear and Space Arms talks in Geneva, nuclear testing proposals, and confidence building measures. The most significant issues in the area of confidence building measures were a White House-endorsement of the initial concept in the proposal initiated by two delegation members, Senators Nunn and Warner, to create Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and the delegation's concerns about the current postponement of the annual Navy-to-Navy talks under the 1972 Incidents-at-Sea-Agreement.

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva

Based on the historical record and its preparations in Washington, D.C., the delegation left the United States with different impressions about Soviet positions in the nuclear and space weapons talks, and about prospects for progress in the Geneva forum. On March 12, 1985, nuclear arms control negotiations resumed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. after an interruption of some 15 months. That interruption resulted when the Soviets left the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Talks in, respectively, November and December, 1983. The negotiations resumed under a new and broadened charter, expanded to include space arms, after Secretary of State George Shultz and then Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva in early January, 1985.

The charter of the negotiations was enunciated in a communique issued on January 8, 1985, after the Shultz-Gromyko meeting. The communique provides the basis for claims both sides might make during the talks about whether the various opposing positions presented do or do not constitute "good faith" bargaining efforts.

The significant part of the communique said:

> During the meeting, they (Shultz and Gromyko) discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

Since the talks resumed in March, there have been two complete rounds. The delegation was concerned over the underlying mistrust and misunderstanding which characterized these initial bargaining sessions.

In the START component of the talks, the United States renewed the proposal it made in 1983: each nation was to reduce its ballistic missile warheads to a level of 5,000 warheads, with limits to be explored on bomber-delivered weapons and on overall missile throw-weight totals for both nations. To this date, the Soviets have presented no formal counter-proposal, despite claims to the contrary by Soviet Admiral N.N. Amel'ko to the delegation at the Ministry of Defense meeting, and by General Secretary Gorbachev in one of his public speeches.

Mr. Gorbachev has stated publicly that he is willing to reduce strategic forces by 25 percent below the overall launcher limits agreed to in the SALT II treaty. This was reportedly expanded to include warhead reductions by Soviet Col.-Gen. N.F. Chervov in a later conversation with a U.S. Congressman visiting Moscow. Admiral Amel'ko and General Chervov in meeting with the Senate delegation, only confirmed that forthcoming Soviet proposals would involve both launchers and warheads. However, Soviet negotiators

at the second round in Geneva either refused to formally submit this proposal and answer questions about it until the U.S. agrees to abandon its Strategic Defense Initiative research, or else said they are not authorized to discuss specific details about it. Informally, Soviet negotiators at Geneva also have suggested a percentage limitation approach to restricting various catgegories of strategic forces, within overall aggregate levels below those provided for in the SALT II Treaty, but these suggestions, also, have not yet been offered formally by them at the bargaining table.

Despite extensive probing by American negotiators, there has been little movement in the talks. While the U.S. has been attempting to draw out the Soviets on specific numbers for reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear arms, the Soviets have been essentially unresponsive, the delegation was informed prior to its visit. Thus, it appears an impasse exists, and that the basic reason for it is continued Soviet insistence that the U.S. agree to a ban on SDI research as a precondition for serious negotiations on START and INF issues.

During its meeting at the Soviet Ministry of Defense (MOD), the delegation heard this position reinforced by the senior Soviet military officials. General Chervov denied that the Soviets were setting a precondition in the arms talks, while, in the same breath stating that if the U.S. accepts a complete ban on SDI, in "one month" the Soviet Union would table a proposal for substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces. As the synopsis, which follows, of the Defense Ministry meeting shows, the delegation argued forcefully that the Soviet position did establish a precondition which contradicted the January Shultz-Gromyko communique's joint commitment for both nations to bargain in good faith in all three of the arms control areas.

At the MOD meeting, the delegation urged the Soviets to present, without any preconditions, detailed and specific proposals on reducing strategic offensive and intermediate range forces at the Geneva talks. There are conflicting indications as to whether the Soviets indeed will make such detailed proposals, without which the delegation is pessimistic that progress can be made at the Geneva talks, and it concludes that the Soviets must realize that they will bear a heavy responsibility for continued lack of progress.

Space-based systems and U.S. and Soviet programs to develop strategic defenses were also discussed extensively during the delegation's meeting at the Ministry of Defense. The Soviet officers repeated their claims that the U.S. program was designed to give the U.S. a first-strike, offensive capability against Soviet nuclear forces, and that SDI should be banned. The delegation pointed out the extensive Soviet program in SDI technologies, including lasers, particle beams, and kinetic energy weapons. The Senators questioned why a similar U.S. program should be considered "offensive," while the Soviets argued that their program was only "defensive."

The delegation suggested to the Soviets that the U.S. could not agree to unilaterally abandon SDI research permitted by the ABM Treaty. Recognizing that the Soviet priority in the arms talks is to restrict U.S. strategic defense activities, the delegation indicated

that restriction on both offensive and defensive systems should be discussed in a context of specific proposals for offensive reductions.

The delegation also raised American concerns over Soviet-noncompliance with existing treaties and the need for adequate verification provisions in, and compliance of future agreements. It tried to convey to the Soviets that these issues were genuine concerns held by the American people, and not artificial obstacles raised by the U.S. Executive Branch to prevent the reaching of arms control agreements. Senator Byrd, in his opening statement to the Soviet officers, underscored the delegation's conviction that the President knows that the American people, and their elected representatives in the Senate, will not support ratification of any arms control agreement about which there are reasonable doubts on verification. Senator Byrd emphasized that the possibilities for future arms control agreements are lessened in the current environment of doubts about Soviet compliance with existing agreements. He said that the U.S. reaction to the most recent Soviet proposal for a nuclear testing moratorium was, in part, prompted by these genuine concerns about verification.

Nuclear Testing Proposals

In early August, the subject of nuclear test restraint received renewed attention with a Soviet moratorium offer and an American on-site inspection offer. The Soviets announced a unilateral 5-month moratorium on nuclear testing, tied to the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and to extend to the end of the year. The Soviets said they would extend the moratorium if the Americans joined it. The Administration invited the Soviet Union to send observers to monitor an underground nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. Both offers were quickly rejected. While these offers are far apart in their substance and purpose, they related directly to the question whether there is to be progress toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear explosions.

They also relate to the disagreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union about the U.S.'s unwillingness to ratify two other nuclear testing treaties—the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed by President Nixon in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET), signed by President Ford in 1976. The Reagan Administration has sought to negotiate an expansion of the verification provisions of these two treaties, but the Soviets have refused, arguing that additional verification provisions can be discussed after the treaties are ratified and in force. The treaties currently languish in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but each side has committed itself not to undercut their provisions even though they are not legally in force.

The delegation also urged the Soviets both to reconsider the President's offer for the U.S.S.R. to send observers to an American test and cooperate in breaking the current impasse over verification of the TTBT and PNET treaty regimes.

Confidence Building Measures: Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and Resumption of Navy-to-Navy Talks under the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement

The delegation traveled to Moscow with the conviction that more progress could be made in the less well-known, but very important area of arms control known as "confidence building measures." The delegation focused on a concept developed by Senators Nunn and Warner to reduce the chances for an accidental nuclear war by establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and on an agreement signed in 1972 to avoid dangerous confrontations at sea between the U.S. and Soviet Navies.

The Centers would be established in Moscow and Washington and keep a 24-hour watch on events that could lead to nuclear incidents. They would be equipped with communications equipment equivalent to that planned under the Hotline upgrade agreement. There would be no joint manning in the initial phase of operations, but designated liaison officers from each embassy should be given restricted access to the centers under controlled escort on a regular basis. The U.S. Center would be directed by an Ambassadorial-level official who would report to the President. In view of the bilateral nature of the centers and of the wide-ranging activities envisioned, the Nunn-Warner proposal was amended by the Foreign Relations Committee in April of 1984 at the initiative of Senator Pell, with concurrence of the sponsors, to emphasize that highly qualified diplomatic personnel, as well as military and intelligence experts should be assigned to the centers.

The initial function of the Centers would be to act as a clearing house for all required military and arms control notifications (advance notice of missile tests and military exercises, data exchanges, reporting detonations of nuclear weapons, etc.). The role of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers would be crisis prevention, not crisis management.

As proposed by Senators Nunn and Warner, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center proposal, in its initial phase of operations, would also incorporate a number of ideas or arrangements, all of which have either been accepted or proposed by the Administration, and bring them together under one roof. For example, the President proposed in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September, 1984, that the United States and Soviet Union institutionalize regular ministerial or cabinet level meetings on a range of subjects, including the exchange of 5-year military plans for weapons development and procurement. The Nunn-Warner proposal is that when these meetings address confidence-building, nuclear risk reduction, or other related topics, they be held in the Centers.

In his speech to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, France, in May, 1985, President Reagan renewed an earlier proposal that regular high-level contacts between Soviet and American military leaders be instituted to develop better understanding and to prevent potential tragedies from occurring. The Risk Reduction Centers would be an appropriate choice of facilities for holding these important meetings. The President also repeated an earlier U.S. proposal for the establishment of a information exchange system regarding routine military activities, thereby reducing the chances

of misunderstanding or miscalculation. The President's offer involved a military-to military communications channel, known as the Joint Military Communications Link (JMCL). The Soviets have thus far rejected the JMCL proposal, possibly because Soviet leaders are not comfortable about their military having an autonomous link to our military. It is suggested that this same communications link, with the same assigned functions, be put in the Centers. By modifying this offer in this one respect, the delegation would hope that the Soviets might be more receptive.

Over time, Senators Nunn and Warner believe that the Centers might take on expanded roles, including joint planning for responding to incidents involving the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons by terrorists or other unauthorized parties. Other evolutionary refinements might include joint U.S./Soviet manning of each Center and upgraded communications capabilities to include voice and tele-conferencing systems.

The delegation agrees with the President's declaration in his Strasbourg speech that confidence building measures are not "cure-alls for our current problems . . . But as terrible as past events have been, it would be more tragic if we were to make no attempt to prevent even larger tragedies from occurring through lack of contact and communication."

Senators Nunn and Warner raised the Risk Reduction Center proposal with the Soviets after receiving endorsement of a specific concept for the initial establishment and functioning of the Centers from the Executive Branch on August 26, 1985, the day prior to the delegation's departure (see Appendix E). The delegation was heartened by General Secretary Gorbachev's response that the proposal demanded attention, and the delegation urges the Administration to present it formally to the U.S.S.R. as an agenda item at the summit meeting.

Regarding the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement, the delegation was aware of the values this Agreement, and the annual Navy-to-Navy talks pursuant to it, have had for both nations in establishing basic rules of safety to avoid collisions and misunderstandings between ships and aircraft of our two navies. As Secretary of the Navy in 1972, Senator Warner negotiated and signed the Agreement on behalf of the United States. The delegation expressed to Mr. Gorbachev its support for resumption of the annual talks, postponed this past June, as soon as possible this year.

Meeting with Senior Soviet Military Officers at Ministry of Defense, September 2, 1985

The Senate delegation met, as aforementioned, with senior military officers from the Ministry of Defense to discuss arms control and defense policy issues. Representing the Soviet Union were Adm. N.N. Amel'ko, Assistant Chief of the Headquarters of the Soviet armed forces, and Col. Gen. N.F. Chervov, Chief of Directorate of the Headquarters and the U.S.S.R.'s leading military spokesman on arms control matters. The session lasted about three hours. The delegation noted that the Soviet officers were apparently operating within a pre-planned, well-defined and restrictive set of guidelines as to positions to be conveyed to the delegation.

On behalf of the delegation, Senator Byrd presented an opening statement which made the following major points:

(1) All Americans, including the President and U.S. Senate, share the same objective: to live at peace with all nations. The U.S. recognizes that the U.S.S.R. is a powerful nation with legitimate security interests. We maintain our armed forces to defend ourselves and our allies—not to attack the U.S.S.R. or to employ them to obtain military or political advantage over the Soviets;

(2) The Senate, the President, and the American people all agree that mutual, verifiable, and equitable arms control agreements between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should be pursued vigorously;

(3) Under the U.S. Constitutional system, the Senate is an independent body which will reach its own conclusions about the desirability of giving its consent to ratification of any arms control treaties between the two countries. If a treaty is mutual, verifiable, and equitable, and if the Senate and American people think it is one with which the Soviets will comply, then the probability of ratification is high;

(4) U.S. positions insisting on meaningful verification and compliance with arms control treaties are not artificial obstacles to reaching agreements. They reflect the genuine, strongly-held concerns of the American people and the government they elect. Future treaties not adequately addressing these concerns will not be supported by the Senate and the American people, and agreeing to such treaties is more difficult because of current doubts about Soviet compliance with certain existing treaties;

(5) U.S. positions regarding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET), SALT II and ABM compliance, and the latest Soviet testing moratorium offer are prompted in part by these concerns. They must be addressed, and the two sides should work to find a way to break the impass over verification provisions for the TTBT and the PNET. The Soviets should reconsider the President's offer to invite Soviet observers to a U.S. nuclear test;

(6) Reciprocity as expressed by General Secretary Gorbachev in an April 8, 1985 Pravda interview, is the foundation for the U.S.'s rejection of Soviet demands to abandon SDI research, since the Soviets have long had an equivalent program. The American people, the Congress, and the President do not want SDI for the purpose of developing a nuclear first-strike capability against the U.S.S.R. Moreover, there should be no precondition, before the summit or at the resuming of the Geneva talks, that would require, as a prerequisite to the tabling of specific Soviet proposals for nuclear force reductions, the U.S. to abandon research on defenses which might reduce chances for a nuclear war (Senator Byrd later elaborated to underscore the point that the U.S. is only pursuing research within the limits of the ABM Treaty); and

(7) It is time now to move away from rhetorical public proposals and to begin hard-bargaining over specific proposals which the Soviets should table at the Geneva negotiating talks.

Admiral Amel'ko responded, and stated that the Soviet Union had already made specific proposals during the first two rounds of the Geneva talks, in keeping with the Shultz-Gromyko understanding, and that the U.S. had only showed a "non-constructive" approach which contradicted that understanding.

The key issue at Geneva is space arms, the Admiral said, and the U.S.S.R. proposed a ban on their creation—including research, testing, and actual deployment. He made the following additional comments: one of the aims of the January understanding was to prevent an arms race in space; the U.S. behaves as if space weapons are not up for discussion at Geneva, and the Soviets have concluded that the U.S. has no position on these weapons at Geneva. He added that instead of discussing prevention of a space arms race, the U.S. approach concentrated on certain rules for this race—quantities and types of weapons and the timing of such a race. The U.S. aim is to build a base for deploying "Star Wars," the Admiral said.

In one of the few insights into the developing official Soviet position at Geneva, Admiral Amel'ko claimed that the Soviet Union had proposed radical reductions in strategic systems in numbers of aggregate nuclear warheads and warhead carriers and a ban on creating new systems. He said the Soviet INF proposal was to end its build-up of countermeasures to the NATO INF deployment at the level of British and French strategic systems. He repeated the Soviet offer of a moratorium on both "space strike and nuclear systems" during the negotiations. Rejecting U.S. contentions about Soviet superiority, the Admiral said the SDI program contradicts the task of negotiating reductions in nuclear arsenals. He dismissed American verification concerns by stating that National Technical Means (NTM), i.e. satellites, were sufficient to read license plates on automobiles. He also quoted an American physics professor's claim that NMT permits detection of nuclear explosions with yields as low as one kiloton.

The Admiral discussed the Nunn-Warner proposal for nuclear risk reduction centers, noting that such concerns were also addressed in the agreement last year to upgrade the Hot Line. Also, he said the Nunn/Warner proposal had been initially rejected by the U.S. Administration. The Soviets were prepared to listen, he said, if the two Senators had a more detailed proposal, or if there had been further developments. Senators Nunn and Warner met informally for half an hour with Admiral Amel'ko on this matter later that day.

Admiral Amel'ko described how the Soviets defined research as it relates to what is permissible for the SDI program under the ABM Treaty. No one means a ban on "thinking," he said, but research can be defined as including various stages of production: thinking, drawings on a drawing board, making models, making elements of equipment, construction of prototypes, and testing at ranges. General Chervov then delivered a blistering attack on U.S. claims that SDI is only for defensive purposes, as well as on the extent to which it is only research. He said the President said SDI's aim was "to destroy Soviet missiles." Implying that this was an offensive purpose, Chervov. He said the program contained "a whole complex of weapons," all of which were in different stages of

development, implying that some of those stages were beyond research now. He also averred that research was violative of the ABM Treaty. He quoted Mr. Gorbachev in his Time interview as saying that if agreement is not reached to ban space weapons, "then the Geneva talks lose every meaning."

Senator Byrd challenged General Chervov by saying that the word "research" appears nowhere in the ABM Treaty, and that "research" and "development" are two very different functions. Senator Byrd said "we can conduct research for years and yet not develop the object of the research. SDI research may lead to development, testing and development or it may not," he said. He questioned how the Soviets could explain that the U.S. SDI research "is development," but that their own research into lasers, kinetic energy, radio frequency weapons, and particle beams "is not development." Senator Byrd pointed out the contradiction in the Soviet claim that when the U.S. conducts such research, it is for "first strike" purposes, but that when the Soviets do so, it is not for "first strike" purposes.

General Chervov admitted the ABM Treaty did not contain the word "research" but he claimed that research consumes 90% of the funds spent for development, implying that research and development are not separable. He also said that the goal of the SDI research made it non-permissible under the ABM Treaty, since experts cannot establish a dividing line between research and the beginning of practical development.

Senator Nunn pressed General Chervov to define more precisely where he draws the dividing line between research and other activities. General Chervov refused. Senator Nunn supported Senator Byrd's statement on the contradictory Soviet positions about Soviet and U.S. research programs. He asked how the U.S. could respond to a Soviet position which was a "no-position": namely that there was no way to draw a line between research and other activities.

Senator Nunn challenged the Soviets to table a proposal at Geneva defining a line between research and other activities, and said the U.S. could then respond to that proposal. He said that if the Soviets tabled a specific proposal for reductions in offensive forces at Geneva, then both sides could approach an understanding on defenses. He continued that the only reason the U.S. is conducting research on defenses is to counter Soviet offensive forces and that fewer offensive missiles would lessen the need for defensive measures. Senator Nunn went on to conclude that if the Soviets "really want to test the U.S.'s commitment to SDI, you should table a proposal defining what you mean by 'significant offensive cuts' and a proposal defining what you mean by 'development'—where you draw the line on research in a logical way." Together such proposals would "go a long way to helping assess whether the U.S. needs an SDI," he said.

General Chervov agreed that this is a matter for the negotiations at Geneva, and that the discussion with the Senate delegation was only an exchange of views. But he said that the U.S.S.R. had already stated its position clearly, both in Mr. Gorbachev's interview with Time and at Geneva, and that if the U.S. accepts a complete ban on SDI, in "one month" the Soviet Union will table a proposal for substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces.

Senator Byrd pointed out that, earlier in the discussion, the Soviets had said there were no preconditions for the Geneva talks: yet, General Chervov had just stated a precondition in his outline of the timing of the Soviet proposal for offensive reductions. Chervov alleged that his outline did not represent a precondition, but that it was the understanding between Shultz and Gromyko that one subject of the Geneva talks was to prevent an arms race in space, and that could not be done if the U.S. was developing space weapons.

Later, Chervov again denied that the Soviet position was a precondition by saying it was "the understanding of the order of talks in Geneva." At that point, Senator Mitchell stated "What you have said today is a precondition if I ever heard one." Senator Mitchell continued that the Soviet position of not proposing specific offensive weapons reductions until after an SDI ban is agreed to has two possible meanings, either of which calls into question whether the Soviets are meeting their obligation in the Geneva understanding to negotiate in good faith in all three areas (START, INF, Space Weapons). He said the Soviet position means either first, they do not have a position or that they are not ready to present it, or second, they have such a position and will only make it available when the SDI ban is accepted.

In response, Chervov said the Soviet position is well-defined and said it was Senator Mitchell's second conclusion. Chervov did say that both sides must make concessions at the negotiations, but that the concessions the Soviets were prepared to make were in strategic weapons in exchange for the SDI ban.

Senator Mitchell's final conclusion was that the Soviet position of not proposing offensive cuts until after the SDI ban was accepted was not in full compliance with the Shultz-Gromyko understanding. "To have it (a specific proposal) and not present it unless your precondition is met is not what I consider to be negotiating in good faith as outlined in the January understanding," he said.

Chervov again said it was not possible to reduce strategic offensive weapons when, simultaneously, strategic defensive weapons are produced. He said "We understood that in 1969 (when the ABM and SALT I treaty negotiations began)." He also said that SDI's continuation would mean the "fall of the ABM Treaty, and the complete basis of our relations would be undermined."

Senator DeConcini stated that, after listening to the discussion, he was extremely discouraged by the Soviet demand that the U.S. meet the Soviet threshold precondition of banning SDI before the Soviets will present offensive reduction proposals, saying "the stage is set for a failure of the negotiations at the summit and at the Geneva talks." Admiral Amel'ko then said that he and General Chervov were "not trying to forecast the outcome of the summit," although the Soviet negotiators at Geneva shared the views both officers expressed.

ii. Human rights

Of the many factors influencing the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, none is more controversial and prone to misunderstanding by the Soviet Government than the issue of human rights. The delegation attempted to impress upon the Soviet leadership the deep commitment and concerns with

which the human rights issue is viewed by most members of the Senate and by many of the people they represent. The delegation expressed its conviction that the Soviet Government needed to recognize that progress to improve the overall relationships between our two nations would be hindered unless the human rights situation improved in the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, Soviet reaction to this message indicated that the Soviet Government still fails to understand the depth of feeling about human rights which creates an objective political fact-of-life influencing Congressional consideration of U.S.-Soviet issues, and which the Soviet leadership must take into account in the development of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship.

While in the Soviet Union, the delegation focused on human rights in three ways: by raising the issue directly with General Secretary Gorbachev during its meeting with him; by meeting with many Soviet citizens, and individuals with both U.S. and Soviet citizenship, whose human rights have been denied; and by submitting to Mr. Gorbachev two strong letters of concern.

One letter contained the names of approximately 215 Jews and members of other Soviet minority groups discriminated against in the U.S.S.R. Most of these individuals have sought to emigrate, while others have struggled to protect their religious and cultural heritages in the Soviet Union by maintaining non-Russian languages and traditions. The second letter, containing some 55 names, addressed the delegation's concerns about Soviet discrimination against its citizens who marry Americans and who wish to emigrate to join their spouses, and against its citizens who also are American citizens and wish to exercise their U.S. citizenship rights. Both letters were signed by all members of the delegation. They were presented personally to General Secretary Gorbachev by Senator Byrd. Both letters urged the Soviet leadership to consider favorably the case of each individual listed by the delegation.

In its first letter, the delegation stated that it had no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R., but that human rights is a "legitimate international concern" because the Soviet Union had signed several international human rights agreements, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "There is particular compassion in our country for those of Jewish ancestry and various religious faiths who wish to emigrate. . . . We further express concern for other individuals and groups in the Soviet Union seeking to exercise their basic 'human rights' including Pentacostals, Baptists, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians," the delegation wrote.

The letter highlighted the particular concern Americans have for the welfare of certain individuals whose plights have epitomized the Soviet Union's disturbing record of non-compliance with its freely-accepted, international human rights commitments. These individuals are Anatoly Shcharansky, Andrei Sakharov, Raoul Wallenberg, and Yuri Orlov, who have been imprisoned, placed under house arrest, or whose fate is unknown. To symbolize the American interest in resolving the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, members of the delegation also laid a wreath at the square bearing his name in Budapest, Hungary. In its letter, the delegation stated that the Soviet Union deserved "positive recognition for its recent decision to release Isaak Shkolnik, a former Prisoner of Con-

science," but the Senators earnestly urged General Secretary Gorbachev to take further positive steps.

The second letter, dealing with family reunification and dual citizenship issues, urged the Soviet leadership to permit the emigration of individuals who "have spoken only of their desire to return to the land of their birth to be reunited with their families, or to join their American spouses." The delegation letter continued: "We are serious in our commitment to work for a more positive relationship based on mutual respect . . . Discussing the critical issues of arms control and the improvement of relations between our two countries is difficult in the face of these continuing personal tragedies . . . The emigration of these individuals and their families poses no threat to the Soviet Union and it is a small step for a great country. Such a decision would improve the atmosphere in which we can discuss those problems which affect not only the future of our two countries, but also that of the whole of mankind."

Members of the delegation met in both Kiev and Moscow with Soviet citizens, and individuals possessing both U.S. and Soviet citizenship, whose human rights have been denied. The quiet courage of these individuals and their families, in the face of such adversities, reinforced the admiration for them already felt by the delegation. The delegation was disappointed, although not surprized, by General Secretary Gorbachev's statements on human rights, made in response to the delegation's declaration of its concerns. A discussion of the General Secretary's remarks in this area is contained in the section of this report specifically devoted to the meeting between him and the delegation.

iii. Economic and trade issues

Current U.S./Soviet trade is very small, considering the size of the two economies. In 1984, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union totalled $3.3 billion, while imports of Soviet products were less than $600 million. Soviet imports account for less than 0.2% of total U.S. imports. More than 56% of Soviet trade is with communist countries. Eighty percent of our trade with the Soviets is the result of Soviet purchases of American agricultural products (mostly grain), and two-way trade in fertilizers and constituent products. Trade in manufactured goods is very small.

Two events have limited trade prospects, and both are American responses to Soviet policy. First, the 1974 passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act prevented extension of non-discriminatory Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, and access to official credit to the Soviet Union. The Soviets declined to comply with conditions which the amendment placed on Soviet emigration policy as a prerequisite for receiving MFN and access to credits. The Soviets regard this as discriminatory, and as an attempt by the U.S. to dictate policy and infringe on Soviet internal affairs.

Second, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan put an end to a significant thawing of U.S.-Soviet economic relations. In response to the invasion, President Carter introduced sanctions which drastically cut the flow of trade. The sanctions included the grain embargo, reduced Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters, embargoes on exports of certain U.S. chemicals, stricter controls on all technologies, and a host of other measures. The Reagan Administration added

other sanctions, following the imposition of martial law in Poland. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the grain embargo. Since that time, his Administration has concluded a new long term grain contract with the Soviets, renewed fishing privileges, and made some oil and gas equipment available to the Soviets.

Trade with the Soviets has not expanded significantly, despite the trade policy changes since mid-1981. In an effort to advance the economic dialogue and make some progress on U.S.-Soviet relations, Secretary Baldrige visited the Soviet Union on May 20–21, 1985, and became the first American cabinet officer to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev. The Baldrige trip also marked the first U.S.-Soviet joint economic discussions since the Afghansitan invasion. It resulted in an understanding that the Administration hopes will increase non-strategic trade. The Baldrige meeting and this nascent thaw set the terms of the delegation's discussion with the Trade Ministry.

Our meetings with Soviet officials confirmed that improved trade relations are a priority for the new leadership. Representatives of the Ukranian Supreme Soviet and of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow noted their interest in renewing scientific exchange programs and improving the commercial relationship. Ukranian spokesmen, for example, noted the mutual benefit of agricultural technology exchanges, and the potential of the Ukraine as a market for farm equipment. These were broad indications of approval, but they gained focus in our discussions with officials from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Our meeting at the Ministry was hosted by Deputy Minister Komarov, not by the ailing Minister Patolichev.

Mr. Komarov pointed to the recent visits of Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Secretary of Agriculture Block, and the eighth U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Economic Committee meeting in Moscow as signs that both sides saw a benefit to increased trade. He quoted Mr. Gorbachev's remarks at the April Plenum session in which he indicated the Soviet desire for increased trade with Europe and Japan, and trade with the United States on an equal basis.

Mr. Komarov departed from the approach taken in recent meetings with high-ranking American delegations in that he spent little time reciting the standard litany of complaints about discrimination and unequal treatment, the Soviet diplomatic phraseology for Jackson-Vanik denial of Most Favored Nation status. Rather, he picked up on a theme sounded in Senator Thurmond's opening remarks by pointing to the low volume of U.S.-Soviet trade and expressing concern that current levels of trade are supported by a few large contracts (he cited Pepsico, Occidental Petroleum, and the grain agreement).

Mr. Komarov also picked up on the guidelines established during Secretary Baldrige's visit by indicating Soviet interest in American machinery, building products, and food processing equipment. Not to lose the opportunity, he also included information processing equipment as a potential growth area. He treated the delegation to an anecodote about the Soviet decision not to buy Boeing aircraft, thus indicating, in Mr. Komarov's view, the Soviet policy not to seek American high technology goods with potential military application. He held up a fork and asked the delegation whether it was

an implement for eating, or a weapon?—this in an attempt to make his case that military applications of technology are in the eye of the beholder.

Mr. Komarov offered his own brief history of U.S.-Soviet trade relations. He stressed the importance of creating "appropriate conditions" and reiterated the Soviet desire for mutually beneficial and balanced trade. He made the point that the Soviet Union was desirous of increasing its exports to the United States. In that connection, he cited the recent Court of International Trade decision in the *Continental Steel* case which may result in the application of countervailing duties to imports from nonmarket economies. He pointed up the devastating consequences that the court's ruling could have on Soviet exports to the U.S.

The discussion with Mr. Komarov, taken in conjunction with remarks by others in the leadership, seem to indicate a commitment to improving trade, irrespective of other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. This gives weight to the argument that the Soviets now recognize the important role that foreign goods and technology must play in current efforts to improve Soviet science and industry. Western technologies are an important supplement to Soviet domestic resources in the current program of modernization and improved productivity. The expectations engendered by the Baldrige visit have yet to result in a specific policy, and the Soviets are clearly awaiting the emergence of a U.S. policy.

iv. Summary of meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at the Kremlin, September 3, 1985

The delegation met for 3 hours and 35 minutes with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin on September 3, 1985. The Soviet leader opened the meeting with a 20 minute welcoming statement, and Senator Byrd presented him with a letter from President Reagan, which Mr. Gorbachev read and commented upon. Senator Byrd presented a 1 hour opening statement which was a product of the entire delegation. Mr. Gorbachev interrupted Senator Byrd's statement once, as noted below, and then responded with a 1 hour, 15 minute response. After this, Senator Thurmond made a statement, as did Senators Pell, Nunn, and Warner. Mr. Gorbachev responded to most of those remarks.

The following is a summary of the meeting.

Mr. Gorbachev's Opening Remarks

In his opening remarks, greeting the delegation, Mr. Gorbachev remarked on our two nations' common ability to think in broad-scale terms and said that this ability provided a foundation for understanding one another. He focused on the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations during the last five years, and emphasized the need to move quickly to take advantage of the opportunity to normalize relations now. Although he indicated that relations had improved slightly during the last year or so, he complained that the current posture of the U.S. Administration was to use methods of political pressure, which he characterized as "intimidation," on the Soviets, and that this would not work.

Letter from President Reagan

Senator Byrd presented a letter from President Reagan to General Secretary Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev read the letter, and said it was a good letter which merited close examination. He welcomed President Reagan's desire for a dialogue and closer cooperation. He said that what is important is to now proceed toward practical steps to promote an improvement in our relations.

Senator Byrd added that he was convinced the President was sincere and serious in his letter and had asked Senator Byrd to convey his high regards and how much he looks forward to the November meeting.

Mr. Gorbachev responded by saying the opportunity provided by the summit is for the achievement of serious steps forward. He put strong emphasis on the need to safeguard the atmosphere for the summit, and on his concern about what he characterized as anti-Soviet, hawkish, groups surrounding the President who opposed the summit and now are trying to subvert it for their own narrow interests.

He added that any member of the U.S. Congress is welcome to visit the Soviet Union at any time, as a guest of the Supreme Soviet.

Statement By Senator Byrd

Senator Byrd then presented a comprehensive statement, which is reproduced in full in Appendix E to this report. The highlights of the statement are as follows:

1. Need for dialogue.—We are here to help facilitate a dialogue and advance the search for realistic solutions to our common problems.

2. Recent increase in tensions.—The past few years have been marked by an increase in tensions and a high level of propaganda and rhetoric, resulting in an increasingly dangerous environment of misunderstanding between the two countries.

3. Historic opportunity.—The present period is one of historic opportunity which should not be missed, highlighted by the upcoming third round of the Geneva arms talks, to begin September 19, and the summit, scheduled for November 19–20.

4. Bipartisan Senate delegation.—The delegation is a bipartisan group of Senators, including two cochairman and two other members of the newly-formed Senate Arms Control Observer Group which is monitoring the arms talks.

5. Broad American support for arms control.—Americans and their Government are united in the pursuit of mutual, verifiable, and equitable arms control agreements with the Soviets with full compliance by both sides.

6. Need for specific proposals at Geneva.—The process of reducing offensive nuclear forces and restraining defensive forces must begin with specific proposals at the table in Geneva.

7. U.S. proposals.—The U.S. has already made a specific proposal at Geneva to limit the total number of ballistic missile warheads.

8. Soviet informal probes.—Senior Soviet officials have informally indicated Soviet willingness to consider a 25 percent reduction in

delivery vehicles and warheads, but have not followed up these informal suggestions with specific proposals at Geneva.

9. Need for verification and compliance.—Effective verification techniques and compliance with existing treaties are essential for supportive American public opinion and for Senate approval of new treaties.

10. Role of U.S. public opinion.—Negative perceptions on the part of public opinion put tremendous pressures on the way Senators approach agreements with other nations. For example, the Soviet movement of troops into Afghanistan killed the SALT II Treaty even though then-Majority Leader Senator Byrd had earlier judged that agreement to be in our national security interest to ratify.

11. Salt II "no-undercut" policy.—President Reagan, with Senate encouragement, supported an extension of the SALT II "no undercut" policy.

12. No unilateral advantages.—Full adherence to operative treaties require that both sides adhere to the Nixon-Brezhnev Communique of May 29, 1972, which provided that neither side should seek "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other side, directly or indirectly . . . "

13. Violation of ABM Treaty of Krasnoyarsk.—The question of Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty, with regard to the Soviet radar system being constructed at Krasnoyarsk, is an obstacle to movement in arms control and must be overcome.

14. Research acceptable under ABM Treaty.—Vigorous research efforts funded under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the U.S., and also being conducted in the Soviet Union, are acceptable under the ABM Treaty. The Senate would view poorly any unilateral attempt by either side to violate the limits of the ABM Treaty.

15. Soviet moratoria proposals.— Soviet proposals for moratoria on both intermediate range missile deployments in the European theatre and nuclear testing, are not in the interests of the U.S. because they would put the U.S. in a unilateral position of disadvantage. The European balance must be redressed, and should be negotiated at the appropriate table in Geneva. A nuclear testing moratorium now would prevent us from conducting tests we believe necessary in the near future. The testing question should also be the subject of serious negotiations, with a long-term goal of a test ban which leaves neither power at a disadvantage.

16. Time is of the essence.—The Soviets would gain nothing by waiting for the next American administration in the expectation of striking a better arms control bargain. Our problems will be easier to resolve if we begin now.

17. Confidence building measures.—Confidence building measures to help avoid accidental nuclear war, or the initiation of war by third parties—such as the Risk Reduction Centers proposed by Senators Nunn and Warner—would be in our mutual interest.

18. Reducing dangers of conventional war.—We must reduce the possibilities of conventional conflict, and practical steps should be taken in the talks on confidence building measures in Stockholm, chemical weapons in Geneva, and mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna.

52-762 O - 85 - 3

19. Economic considerations.—Security is not simply measured by military power, but also by economic vitality. A head-long arms race exacts serious penalties on the economies of both nations.

20. Afghanistan.—An accommodation on Afghanistan, involving the removal of Soviet forces, is important for our mutual relationship.

21. Human rights.—The question of human rights is of critical concern to the American people, involving both our perception of Soviet behavior in this area and Soviet adherence to commitments made in the international arena, such as the 1975 Helsinki accords. We urged personal attention to this problem by General Secretary Gorbachev, in particular in the area of family reunification. (Senator Byrd presented two comprehensive letters on human rights to Mr. Gorbachev, included in the appendix.)

22. Other bilateral agreements and exchanges.—Cultural, environmental and scientific cooperative projects and exchanges are of mutual benefit to our two societies.

During Senator Byrd's presentation, Mr. Gorbachev interrupted once, while Senator Byrd was commenting on Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev said that the situation was especially serious since, in his view, Congress appropriates money to continue the fighting. Senator Byrd replied that there would be no appropriations if the Soviets would withdraw military forces from Afghanistan, although that statement, Senator Byrd said, was not meant to concede whether such appropriations are in fact being made.

Mr. Gorbachev's Response to Senator Byrd's Presentation

During Mr. Gorbachev's 1¼ hour response to Senator Byrd's statement, he emphasized the following points:

(1) The U.S. method of dealing with the Soviet Union is not productive.—Mr. Gorbachev repeatedly stressed the need for a proper atmosphere during the period leading up to the summit. He claimed that the Soviet Union was acting responsibly to keep the level of rhetoric low, but that elements in the American political system, both in the White House and the Congress, were not. He claimed that these "hawkish", "anti-Soviet" factions in the U.S. were trying to sabotage the summit, and that what is needed instead is a real political dialogue. He reacted defensively to U.S. statements which he interpreted to mean the Soviets had to change their policies, and even their society, for progress to be made in our relationship. He said this invited Soviet "capitulation." In this regard, he rejected any right by the U.S. to raise the question of Soviet treatment of human rights issues. Although he conceded that there were areas where the Soviet Union could make some changes, he said that this was a two-way street and the U.S. need to make changes was perhaps greater than the Soviet need.

(2) Expectations for the summit.—Mr. Gorbachev stressed the need for fully grasping the opportunity afforded by the upcoming summit to achieve serious, practical results.

(3) SDI and the Geneva negotiations.—Mr. Gorbachev indicated that some action on the question of SDI research was needed before the Soviets were willing to table proposals in the strategic and intermediate nuclear forces areas. He warned that it would not be

productive for the U.S. to use its SDI program to secure advantages in other areas. On the other hand, it was somewhat unclear what action Mr. Gorbachev was asking for in the SDI area as a precondition for Soviet tabling of their proposals. At one point, he said that U.S. agreement to "discuss the prevention of the militarization of space" would suffice for the Soviets to table "the very next day" the "most radical proposals covering strategic arms and medium range weapons."

At another point, he remarked that it would be necessary for the U.S. to "agree" to "prohibit" the militarization of space before the radical proposals by the Soviets for reductions in long-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons could be made. He said the Soviets are now prepared to "discuss" this question, but that the U.S. was only prepared to talk about what weapons could be deployed in space.

Regarding SDI research, he accepted the reality that "laboratory" research, or "fundamental" research, could not be verified. However, he appeared to draw the line at the making of models, the letting of military contracts, or research which leads to design work. These activities can be verified, he said. The real danger, he said, was that systems which are launched into space cannot be verified and it was this which was of the utmost concern to the Soviets.

(4) SALT II and the ABM Treaty.—Mr. Gorbachev claimed that both nations were complying with these two treaties. He said the Soviets were complying because they regarded them as the last barriers to the arms race. Any doubts about compliance can be handled at the Standing Consultative Commission, he said, and that is the proper machinery.

(5) Nuclear Testing Moratorium.—Mr. Gorbachev rejected U.S. arguments about verification problems and claimed that the Soviets had interrupted their testing series, rather than completing it. He said there had been opposition to this decision in the Soviet Union, but it had been taken at a political level. He argued that if the U.S. joined the moratorium, negotiations could resume on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons would be rendered impossible, and that the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpiles would decline.

Senator Thurmond's Statement

Senator Thurmond said that he fully endorsed the statement made by Senator Byrd. He said the American people respected Mr. Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union, and that they look upon him as a leader with new vision in world affairs, new aspirations for the betterment of the lives of his people, and new faith for relaxing tensions with the U.S. He emphasized the unique opportunity presented by the summit for the first step to be taken in arms reductions.

He mentioned that it would be beneficial for the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America—this would assist in greatly reducing tensions.

He said that the U.S. and Soviets stood together in World War II, and should stand together for peace today. He emphasized that

American defense programs were exclusively for the protection of the American people, and that the U.S. had no desire to control any peoples or lands anywhere else in the world.

Senator Thurmond stated that he believed it would be helpful if Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan would meet annually at the summit.

Mr. Gorbachev responded that he liked Senator Thurmond's statement, and agreed with most of it.

Senator Pell's Statement

Senator Pell focused on the desirability of initiating various U.S.-Soviet cooperative measures as a means of establishing a business-like, mutually respectful atmosphere conducive to substantive progress on major East-West issues. In this connection, Senator Pell identified three subject areas:

Joint superpower leadership in promoting a comprehensive multilateral immunization program for the world's children (on September 24, 1985 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a Senate Resolution—Senate Resolution 227, co-sponsored by Senators Pell and Lugar—urging U.S.-Soviet co-operation on such a program);

Superpower cooperation in international environmental assessment, including the development of an international environmental assessment treaty; and

Initiation of an extensive U.S.-Soviet political and academic exchange program (possibly funded in part by outstanding Soviet Lend-Lease debts to the United States), along with a resumption of significant U.S.-Soviet cultural exchanges (possibly commencing with a U.S. visit by the Bolshoi Ballet).

Senator Pell noted that no rational person on either side would contemplate starting a nuclear war; needed, however, are specific measures of cooperation if East-West relations are to progress from the current stalemate.

Mr. Gorbachev responded by supporting Senator Pell's views on the desirability of bilateral cooperation. He also emphasized that in his dual capacity as chairman of the Defense Council and General Secretary, he could state with assurance that the Soviet Union will not start a war.

Senators Nunn and Warner

Senators Nunn and Warner emphasized the importance of initiating confidence building measures, such as their proposal for nuclear risk reduction centers. Senator Nunn said that in the area of preventing war by accident or miscalculation, both sides can be winners. He said the Reagan Administration has now agreed to a specific concept for the initial establishment and functioning of nuclear risk reduction centers. He handed Mr. Gorbachev a paper outlining the proposal, and said that he and Senator Warner are urging the Administration to present it as a serious item for discussion at the summit meeting. He concluded by saying that the delegation hopes the Soviets would be receptive to it.

Gorbachev responded positively, saying the idea demands attention.

Senator Warner associated himself with Senator Nunn's remarks and said the proposal was the product of three years of work by some of the finest minds on national security in the U.S.

He then emphasized the value of the annual Navy-to-Navy talks pursuant to the 1972 Incidents-at-Sea agreement. He said the agreement, which he as then-Secretary of the Navy, had signed in 1972 in Moscow, had worked well because it proceeded on the basis of treating each Navy with equal professional competence and that it was a "living agreement" requiring annual review. He indicated he had written to and spoken with President Reagan on this matter and was optimistic that the talks could be rescheduled in 1985.

Senator Warner associated himself with Senator Thurmond's statement, recommending that consideration be given for summit meetings to be held annually.

Mr. Gorbachev then indicated he would have to attend another important meeting, and the session ended.

Impressions of Mr. Gorbachev

In his initial opening statement of about 20 minutes, Mr. Gorbachev spoke only infrequently from notes. He made extensive notes during Senator Byrd's opening statement on behalf of the delegation. He did not confer with his aides in developing his remarks during the 3½ hour meeting.

He was apparently at ease in discussing the wide range of topics which were raised. He had a good working understanding of the concepts involved, and was able to express his position on those concepts from different perspectives. He also revealed an ability to respond quickly to a point made, with conviction and clarity.

Mr. Gorbachev seems able, is articulate and has a versatile personality. He can be somewhat engaging as well as challenging. He presents an impressive amount of personal confidence and control, and is animated and alert. He tends to elaborate on his points, rather than truncate the discussion, as was clear when he took 1¼ hours to respond, point by point, to Senator Byrd's statement.

This represents a significant departure from the style of previous Soviet leaders, who were more formal and less versatile in their dealings across the table with American officials. Although this style may give the impression of greater openness or flexibility on issues by Mr. Gorbachev compared with his predecessors, the delegation believes that the late Mr. Brezhnev also displayed substantial flexibility, particularly in his co-authorship of the policy of detente and in his signing of the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II accords. Thus, the impression of a "new" style with Mr. Gorbachev may more accurately reflect his relative youth—in striking contrast to the infirmity which characterized the latter part of the Brezhnev era and the short-lived regimes of Messrs. Andropov and Chernenko which followed.

The delegation believes that, like several world leaders, Mr. Gorbachev has a high degree of competency. Nevertheless, it remains unclear as to whether, even though he displays substantial knowledge of American politics and society, Mr. Gorbachev has developed a real understanding of the dynamics of our system.

Personal assessments are, at best, a difficult and sometimes even dangerous undertaking. It is widely believed, for instance, that former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev basically underestimated President Kennedy's mettle, as a result of a personal meeting between the two men, and that it was that error which emboldened Mr. Khrushchev to risk placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. This major miscalculation, of course, led the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war. The delegation believes, therefore, that prudence dictates that neither leader make any similar quick assessment about the other at the upcoming summit. We believe that both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev are strong-willed men who will take whatever steps are necessary to protect the vital interests of the respective nation of each.

Mr. Gorbachev displays irritation when confronted with a position that he seems to interpret as an intrusion into Soviet internal affairs, or that he believes to slight the Soviet Union as a superpower unequal to the United States. At times, this seems to take the form of defensiveness: he reacted strongly to suggestions that improvements in the treatment of human rights needed his personal attention, and he accused the United States of attempting to "intimidate" the Soviet Union on matters such as SDI. He is particularly sensitive to contentions that the Soviet Union must change its positions on, e.g., human rights, for any accommodations on other issues to be reached; he remarked strongly upon the speech by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane in this connection, and made a critical reference to comments made recently by President Reagan to the effect that the Soviet Union was "upset" by the SDI program.

It is also clear that Mr. Gorbachev wishes his positions to be widely understood and respected. He is developing his skills in using the American media to foster his purpose—illustrated by his extensive interview in Time magazine of September 2, 1985. During his meeting with the delegation, he referred repeatedly to various positions he had stated in that interview.

D. Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) The Soviets are making an agreement (or, as they have sometimes indicated, the opening of discussions at the table in Geneva) on SDI research a precondition for even the tabling of Soviet proposals on reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems. However, while refusing to table proposals in these latter two areas, they have indicated that they have proposals already drafted. Furthermore, they have hinted about the substance of such proposals informally, away from the negotiating table. It should be made clear that proposals in all three negotiating areas should go forward simultaneously. Preconditions by the Soviets threaten to shred the entire fabric of the Geneva talks.

The responsibility clearly lies with the Soviets to formally offer at the table in Geneva the proposals Mr. Gorbachev told the delegation the Soviets had prepared. The Soviets have an opportuntiy to test the Administration on the SDI program by offering formal proposals at the Geneva talks in all three negotiating areas. The Senate delegation believes that the combination of statements

made by Mr. Gorbachev during its meeting, along with his remarks in this Time magazine interview, represent a modest step forward in the Soviet treatment of research on strategic defense systems. Whereas prior to the delegation's visit, the Soviets were insisting on a total ban on research, these recent statements by Mr. Gorbachev indicate a willingness to agree to research within narrowly defined parameters. The task now is to negotiate parameters of reseach acceptable to both sides. We believe it is in the Soviet Union's interests to formally offer their interpretation of acceptable research so as to move forward on this difficult issue in a constructive way. Controls on offensive and defensive systems are logically linked, and the question of the future of both the SDI and the Soviet strategic defense program will depend heavily on arrangements that can be agreed to on offensive weapons. It seems inescapable that forward movement on both offensive and defensive systems must be in tandem, and, therefore, negotiations should proceed simultaneously on the full range of questions in Geneva, as indicated clearly in the Shultz-Gromyko communique of January 8, 1985.

We encourage the Soviets to make these proposals during the current third round of the Geneva talks, so as not to overload the work that must be done at the summit. The summit will be a more productive undertaking if the preparatory work can significantly progress during the third round of talks which began in Geneva on September 19.

(2) Regular contacts between Soviet and American officials are highly desirable during what appears to be a relatively fluid period of assessments and attitude-formation on the part of both leaderships. The delegation believes that the more personal contacts can reasonably and purposefully be made, the less the chance that misunderstandings of a fundamental nature will develop. The delegation feels that regularized exchanges between the Congress and Soviet decision-makers in all areas is desirable.

(3) The Soviet publicity campaign leading up to the summit is geared toward building support, in Europe, the United States, as well as the Third World, for seeming Soviet flexibility on arms control issues. An inherent advantage for the Soviets is their complete accessibility to Western publics because of the open nature of Western societies. The American message has so far been almost, if not completely shielded from Soviet society. The Administration is encouraged to request formally, and repeatedly, that President Reagan and other American spokespersons be given access to the Soviet media to make the U.S. case on arms control matters and other bilateral issues. This request should point out the unimpeded access to U.S. and other western news media enjoyed by Soviet spokesmen. If, as expected, the Soviets refuse such access, the Soviet response should be well-publicized to West European publics.

If the Soviet Union continues its public relations campaign, the U.S. has no choice but to respond appropriately, and to formulate and implement no less vigorously its own campaign to communicate U.S. arms control positions and American flexibility to the world, especially to the citizens of our NATO allies. This campaign must be backed up by sound and flexible positions on key issues.

The delegation also recommends that our own government, as well as other free world governments, should join with the media to insist that the Soviet Union allow newspeople into Afghanistan to report without interference on events there. This would permit the world to see what is, in reality, going on in that unfortunate nation and to reach the appropriate conclusions.

(4) Soviet actions in Afghanistan and in the area of human rights constitute two of the most difficult obstacles to overcome in order to put U.S.-Soviet relations onto a more positive track. While the rest of the world remains relatively quiet (with some exceptions) on these matters, the U.S. should continue to remind other governments that these are areas which lie almost exclusively in the hands of the Soviets to remedy. It should be made clear that positive actions by the Soviets on these two matters would go far toward creating a better climate for successful arms control negotiations and for reducing superpower tensions.

(5) The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers proposal which has been developed by Senators Nunn and Warner, and unanimously endorsed by the full Senate, is believed by the delegation to represent a major step forward in the development of productive confidence building measures with the Soviet Union. The timing of the delegation's visit influenced the Administration to develop its position on this proposal and on August 26, 1985, just prior to the delegation's departure, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane informed Senators Nunn and Warner that the Administration endorsed the first stages of the proposal (see Appendix E). Mr. Gorbachev was informed of this endorsement during his meeting with the delegation in Moscow, and indicated that he believed the proposal "demanded attention." We, therefore, encourage the President to include this proposal on his agenda for discussion with the Soviet leader at the summit.

(6) Productive Navy-to-Navy talks between the Soviet Union and the United States have been held annually since 1972, when the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement was signed. The value of this agreement, in establishing rules for safety when U.S. and Soviet naval vessels are operating in proximity to each other, has been lauded as an example of a "confidence building measure" which can be used to reduce misunderstandings and accidents at sea. The talks scheduled for June 1985, were suspended. Senator Warner indicated to Mr. Gorbachev that he had actively supported the resumption of those talks, and had written to, and spoken with, the President in this regard. The delegation concludes that these talks should be resumed as soon as possible and encourages the President to take the initiative to do so.

(7) The broadening of contacts between our two societies should be sought across-the-board, and the delegation encourages the Administration to take advantage of Mr. Gorbachev's apparent openness in moving forward on a variety of bilateral questions. This process should occur at the same time that arms control negotiations are proceeding. Senator Pell offered some specific examples which the delegation believes deserve immediate consideration. These include, for example, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. taking the lead in environmental cooperation, exchange programs cooperation on a children's immunization program (along the lines of Senate

Resolution 227, offered by Senators Pell and Lugar,which is now before the Senate, having been approved by the Foreign Relations Committee on September 24, 1985—see Appendix H), and increasing joint cultural activities.

APPENDIX A

Text of the Communique Agreed to in Geneva by Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, January 8, 1985

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between George P. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

During the meeting, they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups. The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of beginning of the new negotiation and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

Statement Made by Secretary of State Shultz After Release of the United States-Soviet Communique, January 8, 1985

While the statement speaks for itself, I would like to give you my own views on what has been accomplished during these two days of meetings. From our perspective, these meetings represented an important beginning. We can't be sure where these negotiations will lead. And clearly, we have a long road ahead of us. There are many tough and complicated issues still to be resolved. But we have here in Geneva agreed on the objectives for new negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

We have also agreed that these negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups. We came to Geneva with high hopes, but realistic expectations. Our previous exchanges had confirmed that we were generally in agreement that the problems of nuclear and space arms are interrelated and that both sides attach priority to achieving radical reductions in nuclear weapons as a first step toward their complete elimination.

But we also knew that we had our differences on how to go about achieving these goals. That we were able to reach agreement today on new negotiations signifies, we hope, a shared interest in moving forward in the necessary give-and-take required to reach agreement that satisfies both sides' concerns.

An important element of my presentation to Mr. Gromyko concerned our views of the nature of the strategic relationship and our goals for the future. For the near term, in addition to seeking radical reductions in nuclear weapons, I stated that we should reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty that has occurred over the last decade.

On the subject of the Strategic Defense Initiative, I explained to Mr. Gromyko that SDI is a research program intended to determine whether it would be possible to shift to a more stable relationship involving a greater reliance on defensive systems. I noted that it is fully consistent with the ABM treaty, and that no decisions to go beyond research have been made, nor could they be made for several years.

While the issues posed by SDI are for the future, I told Mr. Gromyko that we were now nonetheless prepared to discuss the question of strategic defense. Our views differ on this question. But we have not agreed on a forum to tackle the issue head-on with the objectives of seeking reductions in nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability.

In addition to a group in which we intend to address space arms, whether based or targeted on Earth or in space, we have agreed with the Soviets to establish two other new negotiating groups to address limitations and reductions in strategic- and intermediate-range nuclear arms. I told Mr. Gromyko that we have constructive new ideas to explore in all of these areas, and that we hope for an equally constructive approach on the part of the Soviet Union.

In sum, as I agreed with Mr. Gromyko, our exchanges were frank, business-like and useful. We are addressing the substance of the most serious issues between our two countries. It is a task worthy of our best efforts. Both sides will be giving these exchanges careful consideration and will be following up through contacts and diplomatic channels as we prepare for the new negotiations.

APPENDIX B

Departure Statement of Delegation of U.S. Senators, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd, Chairman, August 27, 1985

I look forward to leading this delegation of eight U.S. Senators on an official visit to Hungary and the Soviet Union. We expect to visit with the new Soviet leadership. We feel it is important to attempt to establish a constructive dialogue with that new leadership, particularly in the area of arms control, and to highlight the U.S. Senate's unique role in the ratification of treaties.

The present level of tensions is much too high between our two countries.

The level of rhetoric on both sides should be lowered. Our great mutual interest is in peace and the enlightened use of all of our resources for our two peoples. In the long run, both of us can win and neither of us need lose.

We do not go as negotiators. The Soviets will not achieve with us any advantage away from our own capable negotiators in Geneva, but the Soviets can make clear to us where their interest coincide with ours. We can help increase our understanding of each other's positions.

This is a historic, watershed period in our relationship with the Soviet Union. This period may well set the tone for U.S.-Soviet relations for many years. We have prepared for our meeting with the Soviet leadership with that in mind. Not only President Reagan but also every other living former American president has been consulted prior to our departure.

Members of the Administration, including Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane have given of their time and expertise to prepare us for this trip, as have a variety of State Department, defense and intelligence community officials. Finally, several private, consultants, including former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger; former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to the President Henry Kissinger, Ambassador and Chief Arms Control Negotiator for Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Control Negotiations Max Kampelman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon, and Dr. Dmetri Simes, professional lecturer at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies have provided briefings.

This has been a serious effort to prepare us to meet the Soviet leadership with the goal to help establish a relationship in our best mutual interests and to help contribute to the success of the November summit and the Geneva negotiations.

APPENDIX C

ARRIVAL STATEMENT AND PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, AUGUST 31, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 12868 00 OF 04 311558Z 6131
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
/012 W

------------------165710 311558Z /62 41

O 311805Z AUG 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4884
USUNFC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS MOSCOW 12868

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

USUNFC FOR KIPPE, P/RM, EU, VOA/GPU

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW AIRPORT ARRIVAL STATEMENTS

ARRIVAL STATEMENTS BY SENATORS ROBERT C. BYRD AND STROM THURMOND, SHEREMETEVO AIRPORT, MOSCOW, SATURDAY, AUGUST 31, 1985.

SENATOR BYRD

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE THANK YOU FOR COMING TO THE AIRPORT. WE ARE HERE TODAY ON A VERY HAPPY AND POSITIVE MISSION. WE BE HERE TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. GORBACHEV AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS. THIS IS A VERY CRITICAL TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GREAT COUNTRIES, AND IT MAY VERY WELL SET THE TONE FOR MANY YEARS IN THESE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IT WILL BE THE FIRST SENATE DELEGATION TO MEET WITH THE NEW LEADER AND OTHERS WHOM HE HAS CHOSEN TO LEAD WITH HIM. AND WE SEE IN THIS A NEED FOR AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE SENATE [SIC] LEADERS OF THE UNIQUE ROLE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE SENATE PLAYS IN THE RATIFICATION OF TREATIES. WE HAVE A DESIRE FOR PEACE. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT PEACE. THE PRESIDENT WANTS PEACE. AND THE CONGRESS WANTS PEACE. AND WE BELIEVE THAT BY COMING HERE WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT WE WILL BE, WHAT WE WILL HOPE TO BE, AN IMPROVED AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THESE TWO GREAT COUNTRIES. WE COME PREPARED TO LISTEN, AND WE HOPE THAT WITH THE EXPERTISE THAT IS HERE ON THIS DELEGATION, WHICH IS A BI-PARTISAN DELEGATION, THAT WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THOSE NEW LEADERS AND TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON OUR OWN PART. WE STOPPED IN HUNGARY ON OUR WAY HERE, AND WE FOUND THAT THE LEADERS OF THAT COUNTRY WANT PEACE. WE STOPPED IN THE UKRAINE ON YESTERDAY, AT THE BEAUTIFUL CITY OF KIEV, AND THE PEOPLE THERE ALSO WANT PEACE. AND SO IT IS WITH THESE HOPES IN MIND THAT WE'VE COME HERE, AND WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO HELP TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES AND FOR IMPROVED NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA ON THE PART OF OUR TEAM AND THE SOVIET TEAM, WHO ARE ENDEAVORING TO NEGOTIATE A VERIFIABLE, EFFECTIVE, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL TREATY. NOW IF I MAY I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO SENATOR THURMOND.

SENATOR THURMOND:

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THIS IS MY FIRST TRIP TO MOSCOW, THIS IS MY FIRST TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE CAME INTO THE SOVIET UNION AT KIEV, DOWN IN THE UKRAINE. IT'S A BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY -- CLEANEST CITY I'VE EVER SEEN, I THINK -- THE PEOPLE WERE HOSPITABLE AND CORDIAL, AND WE ENJOYED MEETING WITH THEM. I WANT TO SAY THAT WE FEEL THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT TRIP. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENTERS INTO TREATIES, BUT THE SENATE HAS TO CONFIRM TREATIES. AND WE FEEL THAT ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT THAT THIS VISIT BY SENATORS HERE CAN BE VERY VALUABLE TO OUR COUNTRY. THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES IN THE PAST BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT THESE DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED. AND AS TIME GOES ON, WE THINK THEY WILL BE RESOLVED. AND WITH GOOD WILL ON THE PART OF BOTH COUNTRIES, WE THINK PEACE CAN BE PRESERVED IN THE WHOLE WORLD, AND THAT IS WHAT THE PEOPLE WANT IN THE UNITED STATES, I'M SURE THAT'S WHAT THE PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION WANT, AND THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. I'M VERY PLEASED TO BE HERE, AND I HOPE THAT THIS SUMMIT MEETING IS GOING TO RESULT IN GREAT GOOD. AND IF WE CAN TAKE THE FIRST STEP THERE TO A ARMS REDUCTION, THEN WE'RE ON THE WAY. I THINK MANY OTHER AGREEMENTS CAN BE REACHED IN THE FUTURE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PRESENCE.

Q: COULD WE ASK YOU, IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU GENTLEMEN ARE DETERMINED NOTHING IS GOING TO ROCK THE BOAT TO UPSET THE SUMMIT. IS THAT RIGHT?

SEN. THURMOND: WELL WE HOPE NOT. WE WANT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO HELP THE SUMMIT ALONG IN EVERY WAY WE CAN.

Q: SENATOR, IS ANYBODY CARRYING ANY MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND CAN YOU FILL US IN ON THE AGENDA THAT YOU HAVE IN MIND FOR YOUR MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV.

SEN. THURMOND: OUR CHAIRMAN WOULD ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

SEN. BYRD: I HAVE A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH I WILL PRESENT TO MR. GORBACHEV.

Q: WHAT IS ON YOUR AGENDA FOR YOUR MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV?

SEN. BYRD: WE HOPE TO DISCUSS THE SENATE'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF TREATIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. WE THINK THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF SOVIET LEADERS OF THE PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT OUR COUNTRY WHEN IT COMES TO RATIFICATION OF A TREATY. WE WANT THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN OUR COUNTRY THE PRESIDENT CANNOT RATIFY A TREATY WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE SENATE. THEY MAY NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THAT AND WE THINK IF WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THAT CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE SENATE, THAT IN ITSELF WILL HELP TO PAVE THE WAY. AND WE ALSO WANT THEM TO KNOW, OF COURSE, THAT THIS IS A BI-PARTISAN GROUP OF SENATORS, AND THAT WE STAND BEHIND THE PRESIDENT IN HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE.

Q: WILL YOU DISCUSS ANYTHING WITH HIM BESIDES THE WAY OUR GOVERNMENT WORKS, THE WAY THAT TREATIES ARE RATIFIED?

SEN. BYRD: WE WILL DEVELOP THE DISCUSSIONS AS WE GO ALONG. WE WILL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO VISIT WITH YOU WHEN WE EXIT FROM THIS COUNTRY ON OUR WAY BACK HOME, AND AT THAT TIME I THINK WE CAN BE A BETTER INFORMED AND IN A BETTER POSITION TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

Q: WELL, SENATOR, THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO TEST AN ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON AND THE RECENT CHARGES ABOUT THE "SPY DUST" HAVE REALLY NOT IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE IN RECENT DAYS. NOW WHAT, HOW CAN YOU OVERCOME THOSE HANDICAPS?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02
SEN. BYRD: WELL, WE HAVE PROBLEMS, WE ALWAYS HAVE HAD SOME PROBLEMS WITH ALMOST ANY COUNTRY. WE WILL HAVE PROBLEMS AND THIS IS WHAT WE HOPE TO DISCUSS, THESE PROBLEMS, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL BE FULLY PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM, AND I THINK AT THIS POINT, WE COUNT TO LEAVE IT AS IT IS. WE'RE THERE TO HELP THE SOVIET LEADERS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, OUR ROLE AS THE SENATE, AND TO BETTER [illegible] AND TO HAVE THEM BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DESIRE FOR PEACE ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND THE DESIRE FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

Q: SENATOR BYRD, DO YOU BRING ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SUMMIT AGENDA?

SEN. BYRD: AS I'VE INDICATED, THESE THINGS THAT I'VE SAID ARE IN THE MAIN OUR AGENDA. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH WILL COME UP AT THE CONFERENCE, AND WHEN WE COMPLETE OUR TALKS WITH MR. GORBACHEV AND THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS, WE WILL THEN BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO AMPLIFY ON OUR ANSWERS HERE.

Q: IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE SENATE IS IMPORTANT TOO, AS FAR AS THE AMERICAN SCHEME IS CONCERNED. DON'T YOU THINK THE RUSSIANS REALIZE THAT?

SEN. BYRD: I'M SURE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SOME KNOWLEDGE OF HOW THE SENATE WORKS UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION. WE WOULDN'T EXPECT THEM TO HAVE A FULL AND WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF [illegible], BUT WE THINK IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF THEY DO UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES SENATE, UNLIKE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HAS A VERY CLEAR AND DEFINITIVE ROLE IN THE RATIFICATION OF TREATIES UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION. WE HAVE TO HAVE A TWO THIRDS VOTE IN THE SENATE, AND THE UNITED STATES SENATE IS NOT THE RUBBER STAMP OF ANY PRESIDENT. BUT WE WANT TO WORK WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND WE WANT TO TRY TO BE HELPFUL IN REACHING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT WILL PROMOTE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND PROMOTE PEACE BETWEEN THESE TWO GREAT COUNTRIES.

Q: PERHAPS DR. ARBATOV COULD STEP UP FOR A SECOND AND TELL US JUST A LITTLE BIT ABOUT HOW YOU SEE THIS.

DR. ARBATOV: [inaudible]

Q: YEAH, WE NEED THE SOVIET SIDE. COULD YOU JUST STEP UP AND TELL US.

DR. ARBATOV: YOU FORGET ABOUT IT SOME TIMES.

Q: NO (LAUGHTER)! WE'D LIKE TO JUST ASK YOU IF WE COULD, HOW YOU SEE THIS VISIT, IS THIS KEEPING THE SUMMIT ON TRACK?

DR. ARBATOV: WELL, I WOULDN'T CONNECT IT WITH [THE] SUMMIT. I THINK OUR RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTS AND OUR CONTACTS WITH SENATE OF UNITED STATES AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN THEMSELVES, EITHER WITH A SUMMIT OR WITHOUT A SUMMIT. AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE UNDERSTAND ALREADY, AND YOU HELPED TO UNDERSTAND, SENATOR BYRD, ON YOUR FIRST TRIP, THE ROLE OF THE SENATE. THE PROBLEM IS TO GET THE [BEATIES, WHAT TO RATIFY, WE DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON APPROACH THEM (SIC).

Q: DR. ARBATOV, COULD YOU SAY WHAT THE STATE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IS NOW?

DR. ARBATOV: VERY BAD, I'M SORRY TO SAY.

SEN. BYRD: WELL, THERE'S OTHER SENATORS HERE ON THE DELEGATION, IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR THEM.

Q: YEAH, WHAT DO YOU INTEND TO TELL THE SOVIETS WHEN THEY ASK YOU WHY SALT II HASN'T BEEN RATIFIED YET?

SEN. BYRD: WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THAT, IF THAT QUESTION COMES UP. AND I THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT WE WAIT UNTIL THAT TIME.

Q: SENATOR THURMOND, YOU'RE KIND OF AN OLD HAWK AS I REMEMBER, AND THESE --

SEN. THURMOND: WELL, I'VE BEEN THERE THIRTY ONE YEARS IN THE SENATE --

Q: AND YOU'VE ALWAYS TAKEN A RATHER JAUNDICED VIEW OF THE SOVIETS. I WONDER, DO YOU COME HERE WITH THAT SAME JAUNDICED VIEW?

SEN. THURMOND: WELL, I FEEL THIS WAY. THE SOVIET IS A TREMENDOUS POWER AND THE UNITED STATES IS A TREMENDOUS POWER. NOW, IF WE CAN DO ANYTHING TO ASSIST THIS SUMMIT OR LAY THE GROUNDWORK AT ALL THAT WILL HELP THESE TWO GREAT PEOPLE OF THESE GREAT NATIONS GET TOGETHER, I THINK IT'S TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. AND THEREFORE I WOULD SAY THAT OUR PURPOSE HERE IS TO TRY TO PROMOTE PEACE IN EVERY WAY WE CAN.

Q: DO YOU TRUST THEM?

SEN. THURMOND: WELL, THAT'S A MATTER OF OPINION, SOME PEOPLE DO, AND SOME DON'T.

Q: WHAT'S YOUR OPINION?

SEN. THURMOND: WELL --

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: WE HAVE TO HAVE TRUST IN SOME PEOPLE --

SEN. THURMOND: WELL, I WANT TO SAY THIS. IF MR. REAGAN AND MR. GORBACHEV ENTER INTO A TREATY, WE WILL TRUST THEM UNTIL THAT TREATY IS BROKEN.

Q: YOU SAID "UNTIL" INSTEAD OF "UNLESS" (LAUGHTER).

A: THANK YOU. GOOD SEEING YOU HERE.

NOTE: GEORGIY A. ARBATOV, DIRECTOR OF THE USA-CANADA INSTITUTE, WAS ONE OF THE SOVIET DIGNITARIES GREETING THE CODEL AT THE AIRPORT.
COMBS

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX D

Meeting at Defense Ministry With Senior Soviet Military Officers, September 2, 1985 (From Delegation Staff Notes)

CODEL met with senior military officers from the Ministry of Defense to discuss arms control and defense policy issues of interest to both sides. Entire CODEL was present. Representing the Soviet Union were Adm. N.N. Amel'ko, Assistant Chief of the Headquarters of the Soviet armed forces, and Col. Gen. N.F. Chervov, Chief of Directorate of the Headquarters and the U.S.S.R.'s most public military spokesman on arms control matters. The session lasted almost three hours, with half of it comprised of simultaneous translation.

Observers noted that the military officers were operating within a well-defined and restrictive set of guidelines as to positions to be conveyed to the CODEL. It also was theorized that Admiral Amel'ko and General Chervov played the roles of "good-guy/bad guy," respectively, during the discussion.

Admiral Amel'ko made brief welcoming comments and invited Senators to begin with either comments or questions.

On behalf of the delegation, Senator Byrd presented an opening statement which made the following major points:

1. All Americans, including the President and U.S. Senate, share the same objective—to live at peace with all nations. The U.S. recognizes that the U.S.S.R. is a great nation with legitimate security interests. We maintain our armed forces to defend ourselves and our allies, not to attack the U.S.S.R. nor to employ them to obtain unilateral military or political advantage over the Soviets.

2. The Senate, the President and the American people all agree that mutual, verifiable and equitable arms control agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should be pursued vigorously.

3. Under the U.S. system, the Senate is an independent body which will reach its own conclusions about the desirability of giving its consent to ratification of any arms control treaties between the two countries. If a treaty is mutual, verifiable and equitable, if the Senate and American people think it can be adequately verified and think it is one with which the Soviets will comply, then ratification probabilities are high.

4. The U.S. agrees with the principle of "reciprocity" in its dealing with the U.S.S.R., a principle raised in General Secretary Gorbachev's April 8, 1985, Pravda interview.

5. U.S. positions insisting on meaningful verification and compliance with arms control treaties are not artificial obstacles to reaching agreements. They reflect the genuine, strongly-held concerns of the American people and the government they elect. Future treaties not adequately addressing these concerns will not be supported

by the Senate and the American people, and agreeing to such treaties is more difficult with the current doubts about compliance.

6. U.S. positions regarding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNE), SALT and ABM compliance, and the latest Soviet testing moratorium offer are prompted by these dual concerns. They must be addressed, and the Soviet Union should reconsider U.S. requests to discuss new verification provisions for TTBT and PNE and the President's offer to invite its observers to a U.S. nuclear test.

7. Reciprocity is the foundation for the U.S.'s rejection of Soviet demands to abandon SDI research, since the Soviets have an SDI program. The American people, the Congress and the President do not want SDI for the purposes of developing a nuclear first-strike capability against the U.S.S.R. We also do not think there should be a precondition, before the summit or the resuming of the Geneva talks, that requires the U.S. to abandon research on defenses which might reduce chances for a nuclear war. (Senator Byrd later elaborated that he was referring to SDI activities which only consisted of research within the limits of the ABM Treaty.)

8. It is time now to move away from public proposals at Geneva and to begin hard-bargaining over specific proposals. The Soviets should present such specific proposals.

Admiral Amel'ko responded, and after polite comments, stated that the Soviet Union had made specific proposals during the first two rounds of the Geneva talks, in keeping with the Shultz-Gromyko understanding, and that the U.S. only showed a "non-constructive" approach which contradicted this understanding.

The key issue at Geneva is space arms, the Admiral said, and the U.S.S.R. proposed a ban on their creation—including research, testing and actual deployment. One of the aims of the January understanding was to prevent an arms race in space. The U.S. behaves as if space weapons are not up for discussion at Geneva, and we have concluded the U.S. has no position on these weapons at Geneva.

Instead of discussing prevention of space arms race, the discussion was conducted on certain rules for this race—quantities and types of weapons and the timing of such a race. The U.S. aim is to build a base for deploying (developing further) "Star Wars," the Admiral said.

He claimed the Soviet Union proposed radical reductions in strategic systems (in numbers of aggregate nuclear warheads and warhead carriers) and a ban on creating new systems. He said the Soviet INF proposal was to end its build-up of countermeasures to NATO INF deployment at the level of British and French strategic systems.

He repeated the Soviet offer of a moratorium on both space strike and nuclear weapons systems during the negotiations.

Rejecting U.S. contentions about Soviet superiority, the Admiral said the SDI program contradicts the task of negotiating reductions in nuclear arsenals.

He dismissed American verification concerns by stating that national technical means were sufficient to read license plates on automobiles. He also qucted an American physics professor's claim

that national technical means (NTM) permit detection of nuclear explosions with yields as low as one kiloton.

The Admiral discussed the Nunn-Warner proposal for nuclear crisis risk reduction centers by implying such concerns were addressed in the agreement last year to upgrade the Hot Line. Also, he said the Nunn/Warner proposal had been rejected by the U.S. Administration. The Soviets were prepared to listen, he said, if the two Senators had a more detailed proposal.

Admiral Amel'ko then described how the Soviets defined research as it relates to what is permissible for the SDI program under the ABM Treaty. No one means a ban on "thinking," he said, but research can be defined as including various stages of production: thinking, drawings on a drawing board, making models, making elements of equipment, construction of prototypes, and testing at ranges.

To confirm this, the Admiral quoted a SDI budget estimate of $70 billion and said "We don't believe pure thinking can cost so much." (DOD's official estimate of SDI research costs in fiscal year 1985–90 is about $35–$37 billion, with significant research remaining before deployment.)

General Chervov then delivered an attack on U.S. claims that SDI is only for defensive purposes, as well as on the extent to which it only is research. He said the President said SDI's aim was "to destroy Soviet missiles," implying this was offensive. He said the program contained "a whole complex of weapons," all of which were in different stages of development, implying (some of) these stages were beyond research now. He referred to the Senate's decision in June, in the FY 86 DoD Authorization Act, to permit three tests of an ASAT against targets in space as an example of an SDI element beyond the research stage. Other weapons in the SDI program included ABM systems, lasers, electro-magnetic guns, etc.

Stating that Lt. Gen. Abrahamson, the SDI program manager, was telling our NATO allies that we could decide whether to initiate SDI systems by 1990, the General questioned whether this could be done only "from drawing paper," implying the program would have to progress far beyond research for this decision to be made.

He repeated past Soviet offers of "unilateral measures" on no "first use" of nuclear weapons, no space-based ASATs, and the nuclear testing moratorium.

He stated that both the SALT I and II treaties became possible "on condition of a ban on ABMs (in the ABM Treaty)." The ABM Treaty and SDI are fully incompatible, and if one accepts SDI, then the ABM Treaty is cancelled, he said.

Furthermore, he quoted Gorbachev in his Time interview as saying that if agreement is not reached to ban space weapons, "then the Geneva talks lose every meaning."

Challenging General Chervov by saying that the word "research" never appeared in the ABM Treaty, Senator Byrd said that "research" and "development" are two different functions. He said "we can conduct research for years and not develop the object of the research." SDI research may lead to development, testing and deployment; it may not.

Senator Byrd questioned how the Soviets could explain that U.S. SDI research "is development," but that their own research into lasers, radio frequency weapons and charged particle beams is not development. He pointed out the contradiction in the Soviet claim that when the U.S. conducts such research, it is for first strike purposes, but that when the Soviets do, it is not for such purposes.

General Chervov admitted the ABM Treaty did not contain the word "research" but claimed that research consumes 90% of the funds spent for development. He also said that the goal of the SDI research made it non-permissible under the ABM Treaty, since experts cannot establish a dividing line between research and the beginning of practical development.

Senator Warner, in explaining the Senate's vote on limited testing of ASAT's, claimed by Chervov to be part of SDI, said it was taken in response to the Soviet ASAT system. Chervov claimed the Soviet ASAT still was in R&D and that it was a first generation system. He claimed the U.S. ASAT is a second generation system. (The U.S. considers the Soviet ASAT to be an operational system; regardless of its testing record, it is recognized that it has some limited capabilities against certain U.S. satellites.)

Senator Nunn pressed General Chervov to better define, precisely where he draws the dividing line between research and other activities. Chervov refused. Senator Nunn supported Senator Byrd's statement on the Soviet contradictory positions about the U.S.S.R.'s own SDI research and the U.S. program. He asked how the U.S. could respond to a Soviet position which was a "no-position:" that there was no way to draw a line between research and other activities.

Senator Nunn challenged the Soviets to table a proposal at Geneva defining a line between research and other activities, and then the U.S. could respond to that proposal. He further said that if the Soviets tabled a specific proposal for reductions in offensive forces at Geneva, then both sides could approach an understanding on defenses.

The only reason we are conducting research on defenses is to counter Soviet offensive forces. Fewer offensive missiles would lessen the need for defensive measures, Senator Nunn said.

He said that if the Soviets "really want to test the U.S.'s commitment to SDI, you should table a proposal defining what you mean by 'significant offensive cuts' and a proposal defining what you mean by 'development'—where you draw the line on research in a logical way." Together such proposals would "go a long way to helping assess whether the U.S. needs an SDI," he said.

Senator Nunn stated further, and Senator Warner agreed, that "as long as your (Soviet) offensive forces grow, I support SDI; if you table significant cuts and define the (dividing) line on research in a logical way, I would have to reassess (that position)."

In supporting Senator Nunn's statement, Senator Warner said we have heard about proposals through third parties. "We want to hear concrete proposals . . . in Geneva."

General Chervov agreed that this is a matter for the negotiations at Geneva, and that the discussion with the CODEL only was an exchange of views. He said that the U.S.S.R. had stated its position clearly, both in the Gorbachev Time interview and at Geneva: if

the U.S. accepts a complete ban on SDI, in one month the Soviet Union will table a proposal for substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces.

He defined the two sides positions as: "You say you first require our figures (on offensive cuts) and then you'll talk about what to do with SDI. We say agree on SDI and then we'll give you our figures in one month." Responding to Senator Nunn again asking where can the line be drawn on research, Chervov said "there is no such line; the (only?) option is a ban (on SDI)."

Senator Byrd pointed out that, earlier in the discussion, the Soviets had said there were no preconditions for the Geneva talks, yet General Chervov just had stated a precondition in his outline of the timing of the Soviet proposal for offensive reductions.

Chervov alleged that his outline did not represent a precondition, but that it was the understanding between Shultz and Gromyko that the subject of the talks was to prevent an arms race in space, and that could not be done if the U.S. was developing space weapons.

Later, he again denied the Soviet position was a precondition; it was "the understanding of the order of talks in Geneva." (At that later point, Senator Mitchell stated "What you have said today is a precondition if I ever heard one.")

Senator Mitchell expressed surprise and concern about General Chervov's dismissal, as "an American invention," The U.S. claims that the U.S.S.R. has a SDI program. He indicated that information available to the CODEL contradicted the General's assertion.

Senator Mitchell continued that the Soviet position of not proposing specific offensive weapons reductions until after an SDI ban is agreed to has two meanings, either of which calls into question whether the Soviets are meeting their obligation in the Geneva understanding to negotiate in good faith in all three areas (START, INF, Space Weapons).

He said the Soviet position means either (1) they do not have a position or that they are not ready to present it; or (2) they have such a position and (only) will make it available when the SDI ban is accepted.

In response, Chervov said the Soviet position is well-defined and said it was Senator Mitchell's second conclusion.

Chervov did say that both sides must make concessions at the negotiations, but that the concessions the Soviets were prepared to make were in strategic weapons in exchange for the SDI ban.

Senator Mitchell's final conclusion was that the Soviet position of not proposing offensive cuts until after the SDI ban was accepted was not in full compliance with the Shultz-Gromyko understanding. "To have it (a specific proposal) and not present it unless your precondition is met is not what I consider to be negotiating in good faith as outlined in the January understanding," he said.

Chervov again said it was not possible to reduce strategic offensive weapons when, simultaneously, strategic defensive weapons are produced. He said "We understood that in 1969 (when the ABM and SALT I treaty negotiations began)."

The General also said that SDI's continuation would mean the "fall of the ABM Treaty, and the complete basis of our relations

would be undermined." If this happened, it would be the U.S.'s fault, he said; he urged the U.S. to protect the ABM Treaty.

Senator DeConcini stated that, after listening to the discussion, he was extremely concerned that unless the U.S. meets the Soviet threshold precondition of banning SDI in advance of discussing offensive reduction proposals, "the stage is set for a failure of the negotiations at the summit and at the Geneva talks."

President Reagan has said he is determined to try to find common ground between the position of the two nations, Senator DeConcini said. He said he hoped the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, would indicate a similar position of flexibility, and that Gorbachev's view and approach to the talks would be more flexible than that expressed by General Chervov and Admiral Amel'ko.

Admiral Amel'ko then responded that he and General Chervov were "not trying to forecast the outcome of the summit," although the Soviet negotiators at Geneva shared the views both officers expressed. Under his breath, General Chervov disagreed with Admiral Amel'ko saying they were not trying to forecast the summit outcome.

At one point during the discussion, Senator Pell pursued Senator Byrd's and Senator Nunn's point by asking Chervov why U.S. SDI research should be denied, yet continuation of Soviet SDI research is permissible. General Chervov responded with the usual Soviet line that the Soviets were not developing a space strike system and had no plans, unlike the U.S., to develop a nationwide ABM system. Whether for propaganda or signalling purposes, the General then added that maybe the purpose of the Soviet SDI program will be completely different in the future.

The General then repeated the usual Soviet charge that the U.S. was developing space strike weapons and first strike weapons. He listed as first strike U.S. weapons the B-1B bomber, the Advanced Technology Bomber, cruise missiles, the Midgetman ICBM and the Pershing II missile system.

At another point, Warner again asked Admiral Amel'ko how research activities could be verified. The Admiral said that national (technical) means of control (verification) can monitor the pace of development, except for fundamental research.

On another arms control issue, Senators Nunn and Warner told the Soviet officers that some agreement had been reached between the two Senators and the Administration on the former's nuclear "Risk Reduction Centers" proposal. The Senators asked to meet with the Admiral before they left Moscow to discuss their proposal with him and to share with him the Administration's latest thinking about it. The Admiral did not respond.

APPENDIX E

DELEGATION STATEMENTS TO MR. GORBACHEV, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

STATEMENT BY U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER, AT A MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985, IN MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

Mr. General Secretary, on behalf of the Senate of the United States, the people of the United States, and the President of the United States, I bring you greetings and warm wishes for improvement in the relations between our two great nations.

I thank you for your country's hospitality to us and our wives during our visit to Kiev and Moscow. My wife and I have visited the Soviet Union on two previous occasions. My last visit was in July, 1979, to meet with Mr. Brezhnev on the SALT II treaties. Several of the Senators with me have previously visited the Soviet Union. Two years ago, I arranged a visit with the late Mr. Andropov for a Senate delegation headed by Senator Pell.

My delegation and I welcome this opportunity to discuss matters which will be conducive to peace at this crucial time.

Our delegation has had fruitful meetings during our visit. And we have looked forward to our discussion with you today, particularly on the subject of arms control. I was pleased to note your comments on this important issue in your interview with Time magazine of September 1, 1985. You stated:

> I have been reckoning on having an honest and unbiased conversation imbued with a desire to find a way leading back from the edge of the nuclear precipice. To discuss not myths and stereotypes of which we have had enough, but the real problems, the real interests of our countries, our future and the future of the entire world community.

Our mission here today is to help facilitate that dialogue and advance the search for realistic solutions to the common problems confronting both of our nations.

The past few years have been disappointing for all of us in terms of the Soviet-American dialogue. Those years have been marked by an increase in tensions, a high level of propaganda and rhetoric, and—worst of all—an increasingly dangerous environment of misunderstanding. I will not review the painful episodes here because we are all too familiar with them. We believe steps can and should be taken on both sides to improve this climate.

The goal of all Americans is to live at peace in a world in which the legitimate interests of all nations are respected. And this is the same goal to which you alluded in your Time interview. We also share the conviction that although we may compete philosophically and politically, we should do so with ideas—not arms.

In a world in which both sides possess powerful conventional forces and awesome nuclear weapons, Americans know that aggressive military actions by either side can only threaten the existence of both sides.

Our two nations are in a position of historic opportunity. The arms control talks underway in Geneva and the summit scheduled for November between you and President Reagan give us a framework for progress. Now is the time to seize the opportunities that history has presented us. It is to the mutual benefit of both nations to cooperate, to coexist, and to deal fairly with each other. The weapons of destruction that are in place remaind us of this fact daily. It is entirely within our means to deal with each other in a constructive way, to give our peoples the means to enrich their lives, to realize their potentialities and live at peace.

We come here as a bipartisan group of Senators. As Leader of the opposition party in the Senate, I have made no secret of my displeasure with certain Soviet actions. Likewise, I have not avoided criticism of President Reagan or his predecessor on occasions when I felt that their actions and words did not contribute to progress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I suggested to the President and the Republican leadership of the Senate earlier this year that we form a Special Observer Group composed of 12 Senators to permanently monitor the negotiations in Geneva. There are several Senators here with me who are members of the Observer Group. This group of Senate observers has no historical counterpart. Its purpose is to monitor and assess the negotiations and report regularly to the full Senate.

In the event that agreements are reached, the group intends to be fully informed to advise the Senate as to whether the agreements are in our national interest.

The American people, the Congress, and the President all agree that our nation should pursue mutual, verifiable, and equitable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union—which both countries will respect and with which both comply.

We believe that adherence to such agreements can contribute to the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and, thus, to the rest of the world.

But to begin this process of reducing offensive forces and restraining defensive forces, which would be in our common interests, both sides must begin bargaining about specific proposals at the stable in Geneva.

The U.S. has made such a proposal. Our negotiators have proposed specific limits on the total number of ballistic missile warheads.

Senior officials of your government have informally indicated that the Soviet Union is willing to consider a 25 percent reduction in strategic forces—both in delivery vehicles and in warheads—but these suggestions have not been followed up in Geneva with a detailed proposal that precisely defines key terms and specifically indicates how many delivery vehicles and warheads would be permitted each side if the proposal were accepted.

This ambiguity needs to be resolved if progress is to be made. Both nations have talented, able negotiators in Geneva. We should put them to work trying to explore whether there are common

areas of interest of reciprocal benefit to both sides. This exploration cannot begin until we have specific counter-proposals at the Geneva table and until Soviet negotiators are authorized to discuss those counter-offers in detail.

Reciprocity is a key to progress in Geneva. But there is another area in which reciprocity needs to be addressed--verification. You understand the importance of public opinion in our country. The Administration's emphasis on effective verification and on compliance with existing treaties reflects the feelings of the American people, and their opinions are vital if we are to have meaningful arms control. These deeply held American principals form the basis for our position on the SALT and ABM accords and on the verifiability of the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Treaty.

The Senate, any time it considers arms control matters, will focus its attention on verification questions. We are aware that the development of new technologies emphasizing mobility and dispersal of systems poses increasingly difficult verification questions. But without adequate verification procedures, which today cannot be fulfilled exclusively by satellites, Senate approval of agreements becomes more difficult. On-scene techniques are essential. Again, referring to public pressures on our Senate, verification is perhaps the most critical single ingredient in our deliberations on arms control measures.

Negative perceptions and beliefs put tremendous pressures on the way Senators approach agreements with other nations. A striking example, from my own personal experience, was the problem of the SALT II agreement. After the agreement was signed, I evaluated it carefully, and I finally judged that it was in our national interest to ratify it. As the Senate Majority Leader, during 1979, I was working to generate the two-thirds majority of Senators necessary to consent to the ratification of the SALT II treaty. We were short of the two-thirds majority needed, but I believed that there was a good chance of getting the needed votes. In July 1979, I visited with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko in the Soviet Union and urged that we all lower our voices. You mentioned earlier today that you would not be intimidated. This was precisely the same message I brought to them—that the United States Senate would not be intimidated by threats from Soviet leaders. They both agreed to cool the rhetoric. My message to Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko produced the desired result. But when Soviet military forces moved into Afghanistan in December of 1979, severe public opinion pressures developed on all Senators to link Afghanistan and SALT II. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a very negative effect on public opinion. When this happened, my judgment was that the necessary two-thirds vote could not be obtained, in the light of the Soviet Union's sending troops into Afghanistan, and at the end of December, I visited privately with President Carter to inform him that the Senate would not consent to the treaty. Because of lack of public support brought on by that event, I advised him that the treaty should not be called up for Senate consideration, despite the fact that I personally believed that ratifying it would be beneficial from the standpoint of our national security.

Shortly thereafter, President Carter publicly asked that the Senate not take up the treaty.

President Reagan recently decided—after the Senate encouraged him to support an extension of the "no undercut" policy relating to the SALT II Treaty—that the U.S. would continue to abide by it so long as the Soviet Union did.

Americans attach great importance to full application of the law. The perception that one side or another is taking advantage of the interpretation of the terms of an operative treaty to gain advantage, even though the long-term effect of that gain may be inconsequential, has a dramatic impact on our Senate. I would like to refer to the text of basic principles of relationships between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev on May 29, 1972. One provision states that "both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with" the objective of improving our mutually advantageous development across the board.

Any President knows that the American people, and their elected representatives in the Senate, will not support and will not consent to the ratification of any arms control agreement about which there are reasonable doubts on verification. Even the possibilities for signing arms control agreements in the future are lessened in the current environment of doubts about compliance with existing agreements.

For example, a great deal has been said about questions of violations of the terms of the ABM treaty, particularly the radar at Krasnoyarsk. This is an obstacle to our movement in arms control and must be overcome.

The way to begin this process is to encourage serious negotiations at the table in Geneva. This Senate delegation is not here to negotiate these issues.

Our nation hopes that the Soviet Union will take the initiative and lay on the table detailed proposals and numbers on offensive force reductions. The question of SDI will play a role. We should talk seriously about it. We are both doing vigorous research in this field—this is acceptable under the ABM treaty.

Both side must negotiate specific proposals for reducing significantly their offensive nuclear forces. Offensive forces and defensive forces must be discussed together.

Let me emphasize that the Senate is serious about treaty commitments. We would view poorly any unilateral attempt by either side to violate the limits of the ABM treaty without a renegotiation of that treaty.

You have recently offered proposals for moratoria on further deployments of nuclear missiles in the European theatre and on nuclear weapons testing. Our long-term goals should certainly include a comprehensive test ban treaty and a stable balance of forces in Europe. Naturally, neither side can accept any proposal which would put it in a permanent position of disadvantage in the European theatre. Your proposal for a moratorium comes at a time when you have already deployed a large number of SS-20 missiles, which has thrown the European situation out of balance. I believe actions must be taken to redress that balance, and that, of course,

is the reason for the NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Serious proposals in this regard would be extremely helpful at the appropriate negotiating table in Geneva.

Likewise, your proposed mutual moratorium on nuclear testing came immediately after the Soviet Union completed a series of tests. If the United States were to agree not to do the testing we regard as necessary in the near future, we would be agreeing to a unilateral disadvantage. Therefore, it certainly would not be in our interest to put ourselves in that position. The testing question, again, should be the subject of serious negotiations, with particular attention to the long-term goal of a test ban which is fair and leaves neither power at a disadvantage.

Nothing would be gained by the Soviet Union's wasting time, waiting for the next American Administration in the expectation of striking a better bargain. As you so clearly pointed out in your interview with Time magazine, the advance of technology is rapid, and our problem will be easier to resolve if we begin now.

Timing is crucial. We should begin talking now—before we have the technology in hand—so that we can plan to use it wisely. The President has said these discussions should begin today.

Confidence building measures are another important matter. The Senate, led by Senators Nunn and Warner, has initiated various proposals for our two nations to help avoid accidental nuclear war, or the initiation of nuclear conflicts by third parties or third nations. These take the form of better information exchange and better procedures for mutual action to mitigate potentially disastrous misunderstandings or accidental events. The development of such mutual exchanges and actions, we believe, would not only be in the interest of peace, but would also be a step to further confidence building measures between our nations. The upgrading of the "hot line" is a good example of this kind of action.

We also have a common interest to reduce the possibilities that conventional conflict will occur between us. The practical measures to achieve this would be for progress to be made in the talks on confidence building measures in Stockholm, in chemical weapons in Geneva, and on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna.

Your public statements give every indication that you seek these same ends. We all understand that security is not measured in deterrence of force projection alone. It is not solely an issue of military power. The security of any nation also depends upon its economic vitality. No country can call itself secure if it fails to meet the needs of its people on housing, education, health, and welfare. Both our nations are aware of that fact. Both our nations have made economic security a priority. You have demonstrated your strong desire to assure the Soviet people of that hope, and to allow your country to achieve even greater economic potential.

We all recognize the serious penalty that the spiraling arms race exacts on our economies. The Soviet Union and the United States enjoy a wealth of domestic resources. But a continued head-long arms race propelled by mutual suspicion will waste those great resources.

On the question of the third world, it is clear that we each have our own interests. We will each pursue them, but that should not

get in the way of reaching accommodations on the critical matters that face us directly. When, however, actions in the third world present serious roadblocks for our mutual relationships, we must pay attention. We are seriously concerned about the integrity of Pakistan, and encourage an accommodation related to Afghanistan involving the removal of Soviet troops. I have already described the impact that Soviet actions in Afghanistan had on SALT II. And so we hope that you will be able to reach a resolution of the Afghanistan situation and that a mutually acceptable resolution can be reached with an early end to the fighting.

Human rights is a matter of critical concern to the people of the United States. Regardless of the fact that you view this as an internal matter, there is the question of fulfilling political commitments made in the international arena, such as the 1975 Helsinki accords. This is something that goes beyond the specific question of human rights and relates to the broader question of abiding by solemn commitments made by Soviet leaders.

As a nation, the Soviet Union has stated time and time again its support for family reunification. Certainly the failure to issue visas because of arbitrary reasons does not take into consideration the individuals and their specific circumstances. We are leaving lists of some cases with you. These are examples; there are many others. We urge you to personally be involved in reviewing the policies and these cases.

It is important that special consideration be given those citizens, both American and Soviet, whose family reunification rights have been denied.

It is important to understand that issues like these are serious obstacles to good U.S.-Soviet relations, because the American people know about and care about Soviet actions.

Cultural, environmental, and scientific cooperative projects and exchanges for the mutual benefit of our two societies, such as will be elaborated on by Senator Pell, are always welcome developments.

I would reflect for a moment on some things that unite us. More than 150 years ago, a famous Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, made an extensive visit to the United States. His book, called "*Democracy in America*," written in 1833, was a brilliant insight into American character. He said:

> There are at the present time two great nations in the world . . . I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among nations . . . Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same, yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

De Tocqueville's comments are still relevant. Our great mutual interest is in peace and the enlightened use of all of our resources for our two peoples. In the long run, both of us can win. Neither of us need lose. It all depends on our attitudes, energies, and wisdom.

You are in a position of historic opportunity. The challenges you face, in leading your great nation, must be invigorating for you. The challenges we both face, in forming mutually beneficial arrangements between our two great nations are formidable—but now is the time to seize the opportunities that history has presented.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR THURMOND

"I endorse fully the statement made by Senator Byrd. He was the able Majority Leader for many years and now is the Democratic Leader of the Senate. Six of our group are Democrats; Senator Warner and I are Republicans, the same party as the President.

"We respect you as the leader of one of the two greatest nations in the world. You have the reputation for comprehending world affairs better than any Soviet leader since World War II, and being the ablest.

"The people of the United States look upon you as a leader with new ideas and vision in world affairs; new aspirations for the betterment of the lives of your people; and new faith for improving relations with the United States and relieving tensions.

"The United States and the Soviet Union have had differences in the past, have now, and will have in the future, but this is no reason why we cannot iron out those differences and work together for world peace. We feel that the first important step should be taken at the coming Summit meeting in November with our great President, Mr. Reagan. This meeting offers a unique opportunity for both nations to take steps to preserve peace, and we feel the first great step to be taken is to reach an agreement on arms reduction. Other agreements can come later.

"It would be very beneficial if your country would get out of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America. This would assist greatly in reducing tensions.

"Just as the United States and the Soviet Union fought together in World War II, we should now stand together to further peace in the world. You were too young to be in that war, but I was there, and our troops met up with Soviet troops in Germany when the Nazi surrender came. Both of our countries know the sacrifices and hardships of war, and should take every step possible to prevent a conflict occurring in the future. This would be to the benefit of the people of both countries, as well as the people of the entire world.

"The United States has no desire to control any people or any land, anywhere in the world. I think it would be helpful if you and President Reagan would meet once a year at a summit, to negotiate on matters of vital interest to both countries in a manner that will help promote peace in the world.

"President Reagan has advocated a strong defense for the U.S. and believes in pursuing a policy that will preserve our country, but he will not use these armed forces for aggression, and only to protect our people. He is a strong man, like you, and I predict that you will like him. The people of our country are behind him. Again, I hope the Summit will be of benefit to both countries and to the world."

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PELL

Senator Pell focused on the desirability of initiating various U.S.-Soviet cooperative measures as a means of establishing a business-like, mutually respectful atmosphere conducive to substantive progress on major East-West issues. In this connection, Senator Pell identified three subject areas:

Joint superpower leadership in promoting a comprehensive multilateral immunization program for the world's children (on September 24, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a Senate Resolution—Senate Resolution 227, co-sponsored by Senators Pell and Lugar—urging U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such a program);

Superpower cooperation in international environmental assessment, including the development of an international environmental assessment treaty;

Initiation of an extensive U.S.-Soviet political and academic exchange program (possibly funded in part by outstanding Soviet Lend-Lease debts to the United States) along with a resumption of significant U.S.-Soviet cultural exhanges (possibly commencing with a U.S. visit by the Bolshoi Ballet).

Senator Pell noted that no rational person on either side would contemplate starting a nuclear war; needed, however, are specific measures of cooperation if East-West relations are to progress from the current stalemate.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR NUNN

"We read your excellent Time interview with interest and appreciate your gracious hospitality. In that interview you stated there are some situations in which both sides would be losers. There are some situations in which both sides would be winners. In the area of preventing war by accident or miscalculation, both sides can be winners. For the last three years, Senator Warner and I have worked on a proposal related to nuclear risk reduction. Both sides need to do everything possible to prevent nuclear war which could start by accident or miscalculation.

"The Reagan Administration has agreed to an initial phase of what we call nuclear risk reduction centers. I will leave this proposal with you and hopefully this will be a key item at the summit. We are urging the Administration to present this as a serious item for discussion at the summit and, if it is presented, we hope that you will be receptive."

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WARNER

Senator Warner expounded on the importance of the Incidents-at-Sea annual Navy-to-Navy talks. He indicated he had written to and spoken with the President on this matter and that Senator Warner was optimistic that they can be rescheduled.

Senator Warner associated himself with Senator Nunn's remarks and expressed appreciation for the General Secretary's positive response. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Proposal had been worked upon for three years by some of the finest minds on national security (the "Working Group") in the United States, he said.

Using as an example the Incidents at Sea Agreement which Senator Warner negotiated and signed in 1972 in Moscow while a member of President Nixon's delegation, which agreement requries annual meetings for review, he recommended consideration be given to summits being held annually.

He stressed the value of "living" agreements—ones which require a periodic review—in considering further "confidence building" measures between the United States and the Soviet Union.

NUNN-WARNER PROPOSAL ON RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

The following is a copy of a paper given to General Secretary Gorbachev by Senators Nunn and Warner at the meeting in the Kremlin on September 3.

The items listed under "I" (Initial Phase of Operations) reflect points on which the two Senators and the Administration are in concurrence. The Administration formally accepted the specific concept outlined in Section "I" at a meeting between the two Senators and Robert McFarlane, the President's National Security Advisor, at the White House on August 26.

The items listed under Section "II" (Roles That Might Be Added in the Future) represent the two Senators' own views of how the Centers might evolve over time. The August 26 agreement between the two Senators and the Administration is limited to the initial establishment and functioning of the centers, as outlined in Section "I", and does not extend to the question of future roles or possible evolutionary developments. However, each of the points in "II" was endorsed both in the 1984 Nunn/Warner amendment on risk reduction centers which the Senate approved 82-0 and in the 1983 report by the Nunn/Warner Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction.

The members of the working group, under the co-chairmanship of Senators Nunn and Warner, include:

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense.

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (USAF, Ret.), former National Security Advisor under the Ford Administration.

The Honorable Richard H. Ellis, former Commander, Strategic Air Command.

The Honorable Robert R. Inman, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. William Perry, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Dr. Donald Rice, President of the Rand Corporation.

Mr. Barry Blechman, Defense Forecast, Inc.

Mr. William Holland, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment.

OUTLINE OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTER PROPOSAL

I. Initial phase of operations

The Centers would be established in Washington and Moscow and maintain a 24-hour watch on any events with the potential to lead to nuclear incidents.

The Centers would be linked by communications equipment equivalent to that agreed to in the U.S./Soviet agreement on upgrading the Hotline concluded in 1984 and authorized in law on August 8, 1985.

The U.S. Center would be manned by U.S. diplomatic and military personnel, and vice versa.

Designated liaison officers from the Soviet Embassy would be given access to the U.S. Center under controlled escort on a periodic basic, and vice versa.

The Centers would serve as communications links for all required military and arms control notifications (advance notice of missile tests and military exercises, data exchanges, reporting detonations of nuclear weapons, etc.).

Other functions: (1) Meeting place for ministerial-level visits and other diplomatic discussions relating to risk reduction and confidence building measures; (2) meeting place for Incidents-At-Sea sessions, high-level military exchanges, National War College exchanges and other discussions that would promote a dialog on nuclear doctrines, forces and activities.

Joint annual reviews of the functioning of the Centers would be conducted in the Centers. This has proven especially helpful in maintaining the effectiveness of the Incidents-At-Sea Agreement.

II. Roles that might be added in the future

Discussion of procedures to be followed in the event of incidents involving the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons by unauthorized parties.

Maintaining close contact during nuclear incidents or threats precipitated by unauthorized parties.

Exchange of information concerning events that might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, materials or equipment by unauthorized parties.

Joint U.S./Soviet manning of each Center.

Upgraded communications capabilities to include voice and teleconferencing systems.

APPENDIX F

LETTERS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS PRESENTED TO MR. GORBACHEV BY THE DELEGATION

DELEGATION OF THE U.S. SENATE,
September 3, 1985.

His Excellency MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, The Kremlin, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY: We appreciate the opportunity you have afforded us to meet with you for a free exchange of concerns important to both our nations. We believe our meeting is a positive sign for the improvement of relations between our governments and our peoples.

The peace of the world depends on better relations between our two nations, and that peace is an important factor in the ability of our two countries to devote much of their energy towards improving the quality of life of their respective citizens. Thus, both the Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in improving their relations.

In recognition of this area of common interest, we believe every opportunity should be taken to resolve differences between our nations. In that spirit, we would like to discuss, in this letter, one of the issues which has a profound and continuing effect on our relations, and on the prospects for improving those relations.

That issue is "human rights." We have no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union and the United States both have signed a number of international "human rights" agreements—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helskinki Final Act, the tenth anniversary of which occurred recently. These agreements have made human rights a legitimate international concern.

As a nation of immigrants which was created and nourished by those seeking to exercise freely their human rights, the United States, and its citizens, take very seriously the international commitments nations have made in this area.

The American people attach great importance to Soviet fulfillment of its "human rights" commitments under the international agreements both nations have signed.

Americans want a lessening of the tensions—on a broad range of issues—between our countries, and we are confident that this feeling is held by the Soviet people and their new leadership. The Soviet Union did take a step forward in the human rights area, recently, by releasing Isaak Shkolnik, and your nation deserves positive recognition for that decision. We earnestly urge you to take further, positive steps.

The outcome of such a policy will be to the mutual benefit of both our nations.

There is particular compassion in our country for those of Jewish ancestry and various religious faiths who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union and are precluded from doing so. We further express concern for other individuals and groups in the Soviet Union seeking to exercise their basic "human rights" including Pentacostals, Baptists, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians.

Americans have great concern for the welfare of individuals such as Anatoly Shcharansky, Andrei Sakharov, Raoul Wallenberg, and Yuri Orlov, who have been imprisoned, placed under house arrest, or whose fate is unknown.

These concerns create an objective, political fact-of-life that the Soviet Union's adherence to its freely-accepted human rights commitments will be a factor in future Senate consideration of other matters affecting the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Although protestations have been made that all those people who wish to leave the Soviet Union have been permitted to do so, we must take issue with these contentions. Some members of this delegation have met personally with individuals who have applied for permission to emigrate and have had that permission denied repeatedly; in some instances, for more than ten years.

Soviet citizens who have attempted to monitor their own government's adherence to the Helsinki Final Act have been imprisoned and exiled. Individuals who have attempted to practice their religious faith have been harassed by the authorities and tried for anti-Soviet behavior, even though the international agreements referred to earlier, and signed by the U.S.S.R., explicitly grant minorities that right to practice their religious beliefs free of official harassment.

With these points in mind, we wish to leave you with the attached list of specific individuals each with a unique case which we believe deserves your sympathetic consideration. We respectfully urge positive action by the Soviet Union in each case. Under your new leadership, the Soviet government has a unique opportunity not only to relieve human suffering but to send a strong message to the entire world about its concern for human rights.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. BYRD,
Chairman,
STROM THURMOND,
Vice Chairman,
SAM NUNN,
PAUL S. SARBANES,
GEORGE J. MITCHELL,
CLAIBORNE PELL,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
JOHN W. WARNER.

DELEGATION OF THE U.S. SENATE,
September 3, 1985.

His Excellency MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY: We are pleased that you have taken the time to meet with the delegation headed by Senators Byrd and Thurmond. We are here because we believe it to be vitally important to work to improve relations between our two great countries. Because of the limited time available, our discussions will focus on issues which affect the future of life on this planet. We are also concerned about and wish to bring to your attention matters which affect the lives of a small group of individuals, persons who according to our law are American citizens, and persons who are married to American citizens.

Our constituents, the American people, have made us aware of the plight of these individuals, and during our visit we have had an opportunity to meet with many of them. They are not dissidents, and in their conversations with us, they have spoken only of their desire to return to the land of their birth to be reunited with their families, or to join their American spouses. We are enclosing a list of names of persons whom we consider to be American citizens. They have repeatedly been denied the opportunity to emigrate. We are also enclosing a list of Soviet citizens who are married to American citizens and who have also repeatedly been denied the right to emigrate to join their American spouses in the United States. We would like to ask that these cases be examined again with a view toward favorable resolution.

We are serious in our commitment to work for a more positive relationship based on mutual respect. Discussing the critical issues of arms control and the improvement of relations between our two countries is difficult in the face of these continuing personal tragedies.

The emigration of these individuals and their families poses no threat to the Soviet Union and it is a small step for a great country. Such a decision would improve the atmosphere in which we can discuss those problems which affect not only the future of our two countries, but that of the whole of mankind.

We urge you to take this small step.

Respectfully,

ROBERT C. BYRD,
Chairman,
STROM THURMOND,
Vice Chairman,
SAM NUNN,
PAUL S. SARBANES,
GEORGE J. MITCHELL,
CLAIBORNE PELL,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
JOHN W. WARNER.

APPENDIX G

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE AT SPASO HOUSE, MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMI

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 01 OF 11 032032Z 0955 SS03621
----------03117802
INFO TUR-01 Y-01 IN-01 /003 A4 DSS

ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-02 SS-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-06 L-03 PM-10
PA-01 ONE-01 INFE-00 ACDA-12 UCIT-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 SP1-01 CAPN-01 SDEL-10 DART-01 /057 W
----------017852 032036Z /42-38

O 032003Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4458
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USIA FOR P/PE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/EBU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADSHAW/KNI

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

1. STATEMENTS, Q'S AND A'S, AT PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY CODEL BYRD AT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, MOSCOW U.S.S.R., SEPTEMBER 3, 1985.

SENATOR BYRD: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE APOLOGIZE FOR BEING SO LATE, BUT WE COULDN'T HELP IT. TODAY WE MET WITH THE SOVIET LEADER. HE IS ARTICULATE, TOUGH, ABLE, SERIOUS AND VERY MUCH WISHES THAT THE DIALOGUE BEGIN AND THAT THE RHETORIC BE LOWERED BY JUST A BIT. WE FEEL S THAT THE TIME FOR BUILDING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SUMMIT IS NOW, THAT WE SHOULD START TO DEVELOP AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TOWARD PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT. HE, I THINK, SPOKE IN WAYS THAT WOULD -- CERTAINLY LEFT ME -- WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE NEGATIVES AND THERE WERE POSITIVES IN THIS MEETING. AND I THINK WE COULD EXPECT THAT, ALTHOUGH WE REGRET THAT SOME OF THE THINGS THAT WE DISCUSSED WERE NOT POSITIVE INSOFAR AS HIS RESPONSES WERE CONCERNED. LET'S TAKE AGHANISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE. I THINK THE RESPONSE THERE WAS PRACTICALLY NIL, SO WE DIDN'T GET ANYTHING THERE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, I THINK WE HEARD ABOUT WHAT WE EXPECT -- THE USUAL DEFENSIVE REACTION. ON THE OVERALL MATTER OF ARMS CONTROL, I CAME AWAY FEELING THAT HIS RESPONSES WERE POSITIVE. IN WHAT WAY? WELL, ONLY YESTERDAY THIS DELEGATION MET WITH TWO OF THE TOP MILITARY PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, AND THE RESPONSE THERE TO OUR EXPRESSED EFFORTS WERE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, MERE STONEWALLING. WE GOT NOWHERE, AND WE WERE TOLD THAT IF YOU WANT ANYTHING -- IN MY OWN WORDS -- IF YOU WANT TO, IF YOU EXPECT TO GET ANYWHERE AT THE SUMMIT OR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, YOU'VE GOT FIRST OF ALL TO BAN TESTING ETC. ETC. AND WITH REGARD TO SDI, AND, THERE WILL BE NO PROGRESS, NO REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS, UNTIL THERE IS A BAN ON SDI RESEARCH.

WELL, TODAY, IT WAS, I THINK, QUITE DIFFERENT. AND THAT ENCOURAGES US TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A POSITIVE FEELING ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADER, AND THAT HE WILL BE POSITIVE IN HIS APPROACH AT THE SUMMIT. HE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 01 OF 11 032032Z 0955 SS
INDICATED THAT IF THE U.S. WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, IT WOULD THEN HEAR FROM THE SOVIET SIDE THE MOST RADICAL PROPOSALS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THAT QUESTION, THEN THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSALS TO PUT ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. AND YOU WOULD HEAR THEM THE VERY NEXT DAY AFTER YOU AGREE TO PROHIBIT THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE. SO THERE WAS NO HARD POSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT UNTIL YOU AGREE TO BAN RESEARCH THERE'LL BE NO AGREEMENT. THERE ARE OTHERS HERE WHO WILL ELABORATE ON THIS WITH RESPECT TO THE VERIFICATION OF RESEARCH, WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY RESEARCH, AND I THINK I SHOULD PAUSE FOR NOW AND LET THE OTHERS SPEAK. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD HAVE TH S KIND OF MODUS OPERANDA, THAT EACH SENATOR WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK, AND THEN WE'D FOLLOW WITH YOUR QUESTIONS AND, HOPEFULLY, SOME OF THE ANSWERS.

SEN. THURMOND: IT WAS A MOST INTERESTING MEETING. I TOLD MR. GORBACHEV THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE LOOKED UPON HIM AS A NEW LEADER OF NEW IDEAS, NEW VISIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS, NEW INSPIRATIONS FOR THE BETTERMENT OF HIS PEOPLE, AND NEW HOPE FOR WORLD PEACE. I ALSO EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES IN THE PAST, THERE ARE DIFFERENCES NOW, AND I AM SURE THERE WILL BE IN THE FUTURE. BUT WE CAN RESOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES, AND WE FEEL THAT THE SUMMIT IS A PLACE TO BEGIN. ARMS REDUCTION SHOULD BE THE FIRST STEP, AND WE THINK THAT THERE'S A CHANCE THAT THAT MAY BE POSSIBLE. OF COURSE, AS SENATOR BYRD HAS EXPRESSED, WE BROUGHT OUT THE POINT THAT DEMILITARIZATION OF SPACE IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO THEM. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? THAT MEANS, OF COURSE, THAT WE'D GET OUT OF SDI. THAT'S A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. NO ONE CAN SAY WHETHER, IF WE MAINTAIN THAT STRONG POSITION WHEN THEY MEET IN GENEVA, WHETHER

ALERT COPY UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 02 OF 11 010042Z 0855 SO1634

ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 H6-10 E.UR-00 IO-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-00 L-03 PM-10
PA-02 DHS-01 INRE-00 ACDA-10 OES E-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 SP3-01 SAM-01 IOL-02 SAM-01 /047 W

O 010042Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4359
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USINFO FOR PIPE, PIRSE, EU, VOA/BPL

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADSHAW

E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER

THERE WILL BE ANY GIVE AND TAKE ON THAT OR NOT BUT HE DID INDICATE SOME FLEXIBILITY. AND I HAVE GREAT HOPES THAT SOMETHING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.

NOW AS TO VERIFICATION, I WASPLEASED TO HEAR HIM SAY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD FAVOR VERIFICATION. HE SAID THEY DID AND, OF COURSE, WE DO. AND THAT'S IMPORTANT. I THINK AS A WHOLE THE MEETING WAS PRODUCTIVE. THEY INDICATED THAT IF WE GET OUT OF IF WE BRING ABOUT DEMILITARIZATION OF SPACE, THAT THEY'LL MAKE IT GO ALONG, AS THEY, SO HE CALLED IT, I BELIEVE, A RADICAL CHANGE IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. I THINK WHAT HE MEANT WAS A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THOSE KIND OF WEAPONS. THESE ARE ALL MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED. WE THINK THE MEETING WAS HELPFUL. WE THINK IT WAS PRODUCTIVE, AND WE THINK IT OPENS UP THE DOOR OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SUMMIT.

SENATOR PELL: TWO YEARS AGO, IT WENT BY VERY QUICKLY. TWO YEARS AGO I REMEMBER BEING HERE AND REPORTING ON A MEETING SET UP BY SENATOR BYRD WITH MR. ANDROPOV AT THAT TIME. AND I AND MY COLLEAGUES THOUGHT CONDITIONS WERE NOT TOO GOOD BUT THEY FOUND THEY'RE COLDER AND GREATER ICE AGE Than THEY WERE THEN. THE IMPRESSION I HAD OF GORBACHEV WAS, AS MRS. THATCHER SAID, HE IS A MAN WITH WHOM ONE CAN DO BUSINESS. HE SEEMED TOUGH, BRIGHT, ABLE AND ALERT, AND I'M SURE YOU ALL HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO HIM AS WE HAVE. I WAS PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY ONE ARGUMENT HE PUT FORWARD IN THE CONNECTION WITH THE NEED FOR A MORATORIUM ON TESTING. FROM A LONG-TERM VIEWPOINT, FROM A POSITIVE VIEW POINT, HE MADE THE POINT THAT IF THERE IS NO TESTING, THEN THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN BEING WILL GRADUALLY BECOME OBSOLESCENT AND UNRELIABLE. THAT IS A LONG-TERM APPROACH TO RIDDING THE WORLD OF THESE WEAPONS, WHICH IS THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, I THINK, OF ALL OF US. THAT SEEMED THAT THAT WAS AN ARGUMENT, AT LEAST IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WAS AN ARGUMENT, SINGULARLY EFFECTIVE.

FINALLY, I WAS ABLE TO RAISE WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY THE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD TRY TO BREAK OUT OF

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 02 OF 11 010042Z 0855 SO1634

THE ADVERSE WORDS WE'RE SAYING AT EACH OTHER, BUT HAVE SOME NEW IDEAS, COMPETE WITH IDEAS, AND NOT ARMS, RACE. SENATOR BYRD MENTIONED IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. AND IN THAT REGARD I MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT BOTH COUNTRIES COULD ENGAGE IN AN IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR CHILDREN ALL AROUND THE WORLD. AND BY 1990 WE COULD WELL HAVE EVERY CHILD UNDER FIVE IMMUNIZED FROM THE SIX DREADFUL CHILDHOOD DISEASES OF DIPTHERIA, POLIO AND SO FORTH. OR WE COULD CREATE SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT TREATY WHICH WOULD HAVE A VERY REAL EFFECT OR WE COULD TAKE THE MONEY FROM THE STAR WARS AND LEND LEASE AGREEMENT WE MADE WITH THE SOVIETS AND SEEK TO HAVE THAT USED FOR THE EXCHANGE OF YOUNG RUSSIANS TO GO TO AMERICA AND YOUNG AMERICANS TO GO TO RUSSIA. AND I THINK THAT IF WE CAN START THINKING IN THESE MORE POSITIVE DIRECTIONS, WE WOULD SET THE CLIMATE A LITTLE MORE FAVORABLY FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING FROM WHICH WE ALL EXPECT SO MUCH.

SENATOR NUNN: JUST A COUPLE OF COMMENTS. I KNOW SENATOR BYRD DID A FINE JOB WITH PRESENTING IN A FORCEFUL WAY THE BASIC POSITION REPRESENTING OUR GROUP IN AN OPENING STATEMENT, AND OF COURSE, THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED TO THOSE COMMENTS THE MEETING, OVERALL, I WOULD AGREE WITH MY COLLEAGUES' CATEGORIZATION AS PRODUCTIVE AS WELL AS INTERESTING. THERE'S NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS A VERY ENERGETIC AND SKILLFUL LEADER. HE NOT ONLY, IN MY VIEW, WILL BE COMFORTABLE AT THE SUMMIT, HE IS SUCH A SKILLFULL LAWYER, HE WOULD BE COMFORTABLE AT A TRIAL LAWYERS' MEETING. HE PUTS FORTH THE VERY BEST CASE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT, AS WE'VE ALREADY HEARD, WE HAVE VERY FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAIN. WE DID NOT SOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES TODAY. I THINK

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12145 01 OF 11 010830Z 1057

INFO EUR-01 S-01 NSC-01 AF-01 ARA-01

ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 COPY-2 ADS-00 IRM-01 SUR-02 IS-00 G-01 /08
DODE-00 NICE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-05 L-03 PM-01
PA-01 STR-01 INR-01 ACDA-12 USIE-00 OMB-01 SAM-01
PRS-01 IRO-01 CIAE-00 DOEE-01 PA/PM-01 /081 W

O 010802Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4458
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 MOSCOW 12145

USIA FOR P/PSS, P/RSI, EU, VOA/OPA

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADSHAW

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

WE DO NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

I WOULD PARTICULARLY POINT UP THE AREA OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. OBVIOUSLY, THAT'S BEEN ON THE SOVIETS' MIND FOR A LONG TIME, AND IT'S BEEN A POINT OF GREAT INTEREST AS IT WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED VERY STRONGLY TODAY. THE GOOD NEWS AS FAR AS I DETECTED AND PERCEIVED WAS THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH, IN HIS WORDS, IN OUR WORDS BASIC RESEARCH, CANNOT BE VERIFIED, AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. HE DID NOT SAY, BUT IN MY WAY OF INTERPRETING IT, I THINK THAT'S CLEARLY AN EXCEPTION TO THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT HAS BEEN THE UNITED STATES' POSITION FOR A LONG TIME. THE BAD NEWS ON THAT SUBJECT IS THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH, IN HIS MIND, IS DEFINED VERY NARROWLY, OBVIOUSLY MUCH NARROWER THAN WE DEFINE IT. HE DEFINED IT ESSENTIALLY AS BEING WHAT YOU DO IN A LABORATORY, AND UNDER THE NARROWEST INTERPRETATION OF THE REMARKS, HE IS SAYING THAT WE WILL ALLOW YOU TO THINK. BUT BEYOND THAT, WE DID NOT LET A MUCH BROADER DEFINITION -- AND OF COURSE THAT WAS GOT TO BE ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTALS THAT OUR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATORS COME TO GRIPS WITH IN GENEVA.

IN TERMS OF THE CHALLENGE, IT SEEMS TO ME THE REAL CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS TO TAKE THE DEFINITION THAT HAS NOW BEEN FORTHCOMING FROM THEIR LEADER AND TO AT LEAST TABLE A POSITION SO WE CAN BEGIN TO DISCUSS THAT IMPORTANT SUBJECT IN GENEVA. I ALSO WOULD ADD UNDER THE TERM BAD NEWS THE FACT THAT IF YOU READ VERY CAREFULLY BETWEEN THE LINES OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE SOVIETS RETAIN THEIR BASIC POSITION, WHICH IS THAT SOLVING THE STAR WARS DIFFERENCES IS A PRE-CONDITION TO THEM TABLING THEIR PROPOSALS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. I THINK THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE GROMYKO-SHULTZ AGREEMENT IN JANUARY, WHERE IT WAS AGREED TO DISCUSS ALL OF THESE AREAS SIMULTANEOUSLY, AT LEAST THAT WAS MY INTERPRETATION. I WOULD HOPE THAT BEFORE THE SUMMIT, CERTAINLY DURING THE SUMMIT, THIS COULD BE CLARIFIED, BECAUSE IT WOULD BE MY HOPE THAT WE COULD DISCUSS BOTH OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SIMULTANEOUSLY. AND THE ONLY WAY WE CAN DO THAT IS IF THE SOVIETS DO AS WE HAVE DONE, AND THAT IS TABLE THEIR OFFENSIVE

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 12145 01 OF 11 010830Z 1057

OFF PROPOSAL. THEY HAVE DISAGREED IN DIFFERENT TERMS, THE MOST RECENT RUNG RADICAL, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT UNTIL THAT PACKAGE [illegible] TO HAVE A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE IN GENEVA ON DEFENSES BECAUSE IF DEFENSES ARE CUT BACK TO SIGNIFICANTLY OR A HYPOTHETICAL BASIS THAT WE WOULDN'T PERCEIVE AS A DANGER IN TERMS OF FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AND IN TERMS OF VULNERABILITY OF OUR OFF SYSTEMS, THEN OBVIOUSLY THAT HAS TO AFFECT OUR POSITION ABOUT THE NEED FOR DEFENSE. SO, I WOULD CHALLENGE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO TABLE THEIR PROPOSAL AS FAR AS A DEFINITION OF RESEARCH AND I WOULD ALSO CHALLENGE THEM TO TABLE A PROPOSAL AS TO WHAT THEY MEAN BY "RADICAL REDUCTIONS" AND ALSO TABLE A PROPOSAL ON THE ALL-IMPORTANT INTERMEDIATE MISSILES OF INF, WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT TO EUROPEANS.

ONE OTHER POINT THAT I THINK NEEDS UNDERLINING SENATOR WARNER AND I AND OTHERS, INCLUDING EVERYONE HERE I BELIEVE, IS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE CONCEPT WE HAVE BEEN URGING FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS IN DIALOGUE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, THAT IS, THE RISK REDUCTION CONCEPT. WE HAVE MANY DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT GOING TO BE SOLVED EASILY BUT THE ONE THING WE SEEM TO HAVE SO MUCH IN COMMON, AND I HOPE THERE IS A GROWING REALIZATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THAT, IS THAT WE BOTH HAVE A REAL STAKE IN DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO DETER OR PREVENT WAR BY ACCIDENT OR WAR BY MISCALCULATION. I WON'T GO INTO THE DETAILS OF RISK REDUCTION, BUT ESSENTIALLY THE CONCEPT IS THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WOULD WORK TOGETHER IN A CONTINUOUS WAY TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CERTAINLY TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF USE OF THOSE WEAPONS BY SUB-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 04 OF 11 0320262 1865 ...

INFO LOG-00 ...

O 010001Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4461
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USIA FOR P/PEE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADFORD

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

NATIONAL GROUPS OR THIRD COUNTRIES FROM PRECIPITATING A CRISIS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. WE DID MAKE A SPECIFIC SUBMISSION TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV FROM SENATOR WARNER AND MYSELF, AND WE WERE ABLE TO REPORT TO HIM THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION NOW AGREES WITH US ON THE INITIAL CONCEPT. WE ARE URGING THAT OUR PRESIDENT BRING THIS UP AT THE SUMMIT AND WE CERTAINLY ARE ALSO URGING THAT IT BE WELL-RECEIVED AND REACTED TO ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THANK YOU.

SEN. SARBANES: I THINK IT'S ALWAYS THE CURRENCY OF THE DAY TO SAY THAT THIS IS A PARTICULAR CRITICAL TIME FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I HAPPEN TO THINK THAT THAT IS, IN FACT, THE CASE AT THIS TIME, WITH A NEW GENERAL SECRETARY WHO IS OBVIOUSLY VERY MUCH, I THINK, IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. I WAS WITH SENATOR PELL TWO YEARS AGO, ALMOST, GIVE ABOUT TEN DAYS, WHEN WE MET WITH CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV, WHO WAS VERY AILING AND IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS OF HIS LIFE, AND THE CONTRAST COULDN'T BE SHARPER IN TERMS OF WHAT WE ENCOUNTERED TODAY IN THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, WHO LIVED UP TO ALL THE REPORTS ABOUT HOW ABLE HE WAS AND HOW EFFECTIVE HE WAS IN CARRYING ON A DISCUSSION OF THIS SORT. IT'S MY OWN VIEW THAT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS MAY WELL SHAPE DEVELOPMENTS OVER SEVERAL YEARS TO COME, AND THEREFORE THIS [illegible] IS A PARTICULAR IMPORTANT TIME. WE TEND IN THE UNITED STATES TO ASK WHAT DOES GORBACHEV MEAN FOR THE U.S. I THINK WE'S OBVIOUSLY ASKING, WHAT DOES THE U.S. MEAN FOR GORBACHEV, AND WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO ASK OURSELVES THAT QUESTION AS WE THINK ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. I JUST WANT TO GIVE SOME FEW BROAD IMPRESSIONS. I'LL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY SPECIFICS LATER.

WE ATTACHED ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, TO THE SUMMIT. WE STRESSED IT REPEATEDLY. WE HAD THE PERCEPTION, WHICH WE INDICATED, THAT THERE ARE GROUPS THAT WANT TO THWART THE MEETING, IN OTHER WORDS, TO UNDERCUT ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS, AND WE SAID AT ONE POINT THAT WE MUST SHOW SOLICITUDE FOR THE SUMMIT, WE MUST SAFEGUARD IT. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND BUSINESS-LIKE

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 12146 04 OF 11 0320262 1865 ...

NEGOTIATIONS AND IT PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHIFT OUR RELATIONSHIP ONTO A CONSTRUCTIVE TRACK. SECONDLY, WE PUT A VERY STRONG EMPHASIS ON ACTING IN WHAT WE CALLED A RESPONSIBLE MANNER. WE HAD EXAMPLES OF WHAT WE REGARDED AS IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR, NOT BEING SERIOUS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN US, AND THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT A VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY WAS BEING CARRIED BY BOTH SIDES, AND THIS WAS PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSING OF THE ARMS ISSUE. THIRDLY, WE PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPT OF WHAT I WOULD TERM RECIPROCITY IN ATTITUDES OF ONE COUNTRY TOWARD THE OTHER. MY OWN PERCEPTION OF THAT IS THAT THIS IS A MATTER TO WHICH THEY ARE VERY SENSITIVE. THAT WE, IN EFFECT, WANTS AND SEEKS AND EXPECTS A SORT OF AN EQUALITY OF ATTITUDE AND PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AS IT DEALS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE MADE THE POINT, FOR INSTANCE, THAT PROPOSALS THAT ARE SUBMITTED BY EITHER COUNTRY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED WITH A PERCEPTION THAT THEY SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD THINK OF THAT IN TERMS OF WHEN THEY SUBMIT THE PROPOSALS, OTHERWISE SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD BE UNREALISTIC. HE SAYS ALL THE FAULT IS NOT ON ONE SIDE, AND THAT BOTH SIDES MUST TAKE STEPS IF THE RELATIONSHIP IS TO BE SHIFTED TO A MORE, TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS.

MY OWN OVERALL PERCEPTION IS THAT THERE'S SERIOUS BUSINESS AHEAD. WE'RE FACING A LEADER WHO IS IN HIS PRIME, WHO MAY, WITH EVERY EXPECTATION, BE THERE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME AND THEREFORE WE HAVE TO APPROACH THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME, WITH THE PERCEPTION AND THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HOW WE MOVE NOW IN SHAPING THE RELATIONSHIP MAY PROVIDE

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMI

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12140 05 OF 11 032001Z 0956 SS03632
032017Z

INFO EUR-01 H-01 IM-01 000 AO DOE

ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 NRM-10 L/A-00 SS-00 S/AE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 /HA-00 L-03 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 H01-00 /CCA-11 /CIE-00 IP-02 SWP-01
PRS-01 SPD-01 /AAM-01 IOE-10 SAM-01 057 W

032017Z SEP 85

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4481
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 11 MOSCOW 12140

USIA FOR PIPER, PRICE, DU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR RPAO ALLEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE WILL OPERATE FOR
QUITE A PERIOD OF TIME TO COME. BUT THERE IS A
CHANCE TO MOVE IT IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION, AND
THAT WE NEED TO SEIZE THAT OPPORTUNITY RATHER
THAN LATER BE TRYING TO ALTER COURSE IF,
IN FACT, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SET IT OUT IN
A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION.

SEN. DECONCINI: I'M SENATOR DECONCINI FROM
ARIZONA AND CONCUR WITH MY COLLEAGUE
OBSERVATION OF THE SECRETARY AND HIS DYNAMIC
LEADERSHIP AS PORTRAYED TO US TODAY AND OVER THE
PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. HE INDEED DEMONSTRATED TO
ME FOR THE FIRST TIME A SOVIET LEADER WHO SAID TO
US, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT WE MAY HAVE MADE SOME
MISTAKES, MEANING THE SOVIETS, OBVIOUSLY COMING
BACK AND ASSERTING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD
MADE MISTAKES AND WE MUST JOIN TOGETHER AND
FIND SOME COMMON GROUND AND GET BACK ON THE RIGHT
RIGHT TRACK TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS. I WAS
PARTICULARLY DISTURBED WITH THIS CONTINUED
ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION. I WAS HOPEFUL THAT
THEIR POSITION IN RESPONSE TO THE DELEGATION'S
POSITION AS STATED BY OUR LEADER ON HUMAN RIGHTS
MIGHT BE DIFFERENT. AS SENATOR BYRD POINTED OUT
IT WAS NOT, AND WHEN AND IF WE READ THE ADDITIONAL
STATEMENTS THAT WERE LEFT THERE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, I
SUSPECT MR. GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE TOO KIND ABOUT
THEM. THIS DISTURBED ME A GREAT DEAL, BECAUSE IT IS
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO GET BACK ON THE
RIGHT TRACK OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR A REAL CHANGE IN OUR ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP, AND
WE TRIED TO LEAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV THE STRONG
IMPRESSION THAT UNLESS THAT POLICY AND POSITION IS
CHANGED, THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A VERY
ROCKY ROAD, NOTWITHSTANDING THE OPTIMISM THAT
GENERALLY CAME ACROSS.

IF YOU LOOK AT SAKHAROV AND SHCHARANSKY,
HALLFINGER, SOME OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS CASES
OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, NOT TO MENTION THE
LITERALLY THOUSANDS AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS
OF APPLICATIONS THAT ARE LANGUISHING FOR FAMILY

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12140 05 OF 11 032001Z 0956 SS
REUNIFICATION, YOU REALIZE, I REALIZE, AT LEAST,
THAT THIS MAY BE THE ACHILLES HEEL OF A POTENTIAL
GREAT LEADER TO BRING ABOUT A LESSENING OF THE
TENSION BETWEEN THESE TWO POWERS. I DON'T
ANTICIPATE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PRESIDENT,
THIS ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS LESSENING ITS
EMPHASIS IN THIS AREA, AND I HOPE THAT IF WE
LEFT ONE IMPRESSION, THAT SOME IMPRESSION, AT
LEAST THAT WAS ONE OF THEM, THAT THIS IS NOT
GOING TO GO AWAY, MR. GORBACHEV, IT'S GOING TO
CONTINUE TO BE THERE DAY AFTER DAY, AND YOU'RE
GOING TO HAVE TO FACE IT AND NOT TURN AND
ACCUSE THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE WE HAVE RELATIONS
WITH CHILE, OR SOME OTHER NATION, THAT WE ARE
VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS WHEN ANYONE IS FREE TO
LEAVE OUR COUNTRY. BUT THAT'S NOT THE CASE IN
THE SOVIET UNION.

SEN. WARNER: JOHN WARNER OF VIRGINIA. FIRST,
I'D JOIN IN SALUTING THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS
DELEGATION. WE STARTED OUT FROM ANDREWS IN A
BI-PARTISAN SPIRIT WITH A NON-PARTISAN GOAL,
NAMELY, TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND,
HOPEFULLY, TO THE TALKS IN GENEVA AS WELL AS
THE SUMMIT, AND WE'VE SUCCEEDED. THE QUESTION
THAT DISAPPOINTED ME THE MOST WAS THAT MR.
GORBACHEV FAILED TO EXPRESS EVEN A HINT THAT
THIS GROUP OF SENATORS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY,
FULL WELL UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THEIR ACCESS TO THE
HIGHEST LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WERE NOW PARTICIPATING IN ASAT TESTS,
CERTAIN TESTS WITH RESPECT TO SDI, IN A MANNER
COMMENSURATE WITH WHAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS
TO DO. AND THAT LEFT ME SOMEWHAT TROUBLED
OTHERWISE, HE APPROACHED US, I WOULD SAY, ON AN
EQUAL FOOTING, RECOGNIZING THAT WE SIGNED OUT

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMI

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 01 OF 11 031028Z 0957 1503023
---031028Z

INFO EUR-01 H-01 /003 A4 DCS

ACTION H-03

INFO LOC-00 COPY-01 ACT-00 INR-10 EUR-00 IO-00 C-AE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-00 L-03 PM-10
PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIS-00 SP-02 SAM-01
PRS-01 SPD-02 SAEN-01 SCEL-10 CIAE-01 /060 W

O 031000Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4463
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USINFO FOR P/PEE, P/RSE, EU, IOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR AFAC(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

THE PARLIAMENTARIANS AND PAID SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO THE FACT THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE CONGRESS AND INDEED IN HIS PARLIAMENT HAD GOTTEN TOGETHER AND TALKED, AND THAT WAS A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION.

ALSO THAT THE SENATE IS A UNIQUE BODY, IN THAT WE BE A CONTINUING BODY. AND THE HEADS OF THIS DELEGATION, I THINK, MADE IT APPARENTLY CLEAR THAT NOW UNDER THIS PRESIDENT, IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO MAKE A START. BUT THAT THE SENATE WOULD CONTINUE WITH THAT START, HOPEFULLY A POSITIVE ONE, AT THIS SUMMIT. AND THAT MANY MEMBERS OF THIS DELEGATION AND INDEED OF THE SENATE WOULD BE HERE WHEN THE NATION SELECTS THE NEXT PRESIDENT. AND THEREFORE, AS A CONTINUING BODY, WE WOULD HOPE TO CONTINUE THE POSITIVE START UNDER THIS PRESIDENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE SUMMIT -- AND I EXPRESS MY OWN OPINION HERE -- I GOT THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT IT'S GOING TO BE GIVE AND TAKE. TO HIS PERSPECTIVE. AND HE'S READY TO GIVE AND HE'S READY TO TAKE, PROVIDING WE RECOGNIZE HIM AS AN EQUAL. HE'S A VERY PROUD MAN. HE'S PROUD OF THIS NATION, AND HE'S PROUD OF HIS PEOPLE, HE'S PROUD OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER A LONG HISTORY OF ADVERSITY. I DON'T MEAN TO INTIMATE THAT HE SWEPT US AWAY WITH HIS CHARM OR ANYTHING, WE ACCEPTED US AS EQUALS, AS WE ACCEPTED HIM AS AN EQUAL. BUT BEING PROUD, AS HE IS, HE WILL GO INTO THAT SUMMIT WITH THE GOAL OF, REALLY, NO ONE COMES OUT A WINNER OR A LOSER. PROGRESS WILL BE MADE, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF BOTH SIDES. BUT AS WE SAY IN FOOTBALL, THE BALL WILL BE LEFT PROBABLY ON THE FIFTY YARD LINE READY TO BE PICKED UP AT THE NEXT SUMMIT. AND I MAKE THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTION THAT IN VIEW OF HIS EXPRESSIONS OF SINCERITY AND HOPE, POSITIVE HOPE ABOUT THIS SUMMIT, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO THINK OF A SUMMIT ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

THE QUESTION OF THE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTER WAS COVERED BY MR. NUNN. WE'VE BEEN WORKING ON THIS TOGETHER WITH MANY MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, INDEED, SOME FIVE MINDS FROM ALL ACROSS THE COUNTRY. AND WE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 02 OF 11 031028Z 0957 SSC

SEEMED QUITE IMPRESSED AND RECEPTIVE WITH THE DOCUMENTS THAT WE GAVE HIM, WHICH INDEED IS ONLY A WORKING PAPER BY MR. NUNN AND MYSELF, BUT DOES REFLECT SOME AREAS OF CONCURRENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. MR. NUNN AND I MET WITH MR MCFARLANE JUST BEFORE THE DELEGATION DEPARTED. I ALSO BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF INCIDENTS AT SEA. AS YOU MAY RECALL, SOME FOURTEEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO I WAS DESIGNATED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AS THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR. I CAME TO THE SOVIET UNION OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AND SIGNED IN MAY OF 1972 THAT AGREEMENT. EACH YEAR THE TWO NAVIES HAVE GOTTEN TOGETHER AND HAD VERY CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS WE RECOGNIZE, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE VALUE OF THIS MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LINK BECAUSE IT PROVIDES FOR THE SAFETY OF OUR MEN, AIRMEN AND SEAFARERS, AT SEA IN BOTH NAVIES. IT WAS MY HOPE, AND I EXPRESSED IT TO THE PRESIDENT, THAT THESE TALKS, WHICH WERE POSTPONED IN JUNE, COULD ONCE AGAIN BE RESUMED. AND LASTLY, I FELT THAT HE SPOKE VERY RESPECTFULLY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. AND I QUOTE HIM, IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE HIGH LEVEL OF RHETORIC, RHETORIC COMING FROM THOSE WHO ARE DISBELIEVERS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OF THE SUMMIT. HE SAID, AND I QUOTE: "I RELY ON HIS WISDOM." END QUOTE. TO LEAD THE UNITED STATES TO THIS SUMMIT, AND THAT IT WILL PROVIDE A POSITIVE AND EQUAL RESULT. THANK YOU.

SEN. MITCHELL: I AM GEORGE MITCHELL FROM MAINE. BEFORE COMING TO THE SOVIET UNION, I HELD THE VIEW THAT THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS FOR A MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT EXISTED: DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES, ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12145 01 OF 11 031805Z 0950 ISO36:4

INFO EUR-01 H-01 IM-01 /021 AA DCS

ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-0 ADS-00 NSA-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-01 L-03 PM-10
PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 IRM-01 SNP-01
PRS-01 TPD-01 IAFN-01 SOE1-10 CAPT-01 /067 W

031126Z 87/0382 (S)

O 031200Z SEP 87
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4454
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 MOSCOW 12145

USINFO FOR PIPES, PIRSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADSHAW

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

EXCHANGE FOR A PROHIBITION ON THE TESTING AND
DEPLOYING OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS BY THE
UNITED STATES. AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT AND,
SPECIFICALLY, THE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH MR.
GORBACHEV, AND THE MEETING YESTERDAY WITH SOVIET
MILITARY OFFICIALS, MY VIEW HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. I
BELIEVE THOSE INGREDIENTS DO EXIST, BUT I ALSO HAVE
BECOME AWARE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTY THAT WILL
OCCUR IN ATTEMPTING TO BRING THOSE INGREDIENTS
TOGETHER. ON THE ONE SIDE, THE SOVIETS REPEATEDLY
EMPHASIZED THEIR INSISTENCE THAT AN AGREEMENT ON
PROHIBITING STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS MUST
PRECEDE ANY FURTHER AND MORE SPECIFIC OFFER ON
THEIR PART TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. MR.
GORBACHEV'S USE OF THE WORD "RADICAL" TO DESCRIBE
THE PROPOSALS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ON THE DAY AFTER
AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE
SYSTEMS IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO INDUCE MOVEMENT
BY THE UNITED STATES IN THAT DIRECTION.

ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE ADMINISTRATION IS OBVIOUSLY
ATTEMPTING TO FOCUS DISCUSSION IN GENEVA UPON
REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS, WITH
LESS EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON ACTIONS ON SDI.
IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, SENATOR BYRD TOLD THE GENERAL
SECRETARY THAT WE HAD IN HIS GRASP AN HISTORIC
OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL. THAT IS
AN OVER-WORKED PHRASE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IN S
CASE IS APPLICABLE, IT APPLIES TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN AS WELL. THE CHALLENGE BEFORE THOSE TWO
LEADERS WILL BE HOW TO BRIDGE THE PROCEDURAL GAP,
HOW TO BRING THE TWO POSITIONS TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE
WHAT CAN BE AN HISTORIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT
INTRODUCING RESTRAINT IN BOTH OFFENSIVE AND
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH
TIME MAGAZINE, MR. GORBACHEV USED THE PHRASE "THE
IMPERATIVE OF OUR TIME" TO DESCRIBE THE NEED FOR
THE SOVIET UNION TO IMPROVE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE. WE DID NOT USE THAT PHRASE TODAY,
BUT WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR BOTH COUNTRIES TO
CONCENTRATE ON THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. I AM
PERSUADED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY DOES EXIST TO
REACH THAT AGREEMENT, PROVIDED THERE IS FLEXIBILITY

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 12145 01 OF 11 031805Z 0950 ISO36:

ON BOTH SIDES TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION WHICH I WE
DESCRIBED. THE SECRETARY REPEATED WHAT HE SAID IN
THE TIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEW IN ANOTHER AREA, AND
SENATOR BYRD EXPRESSED THE SAME VIEW, THAT RAPID
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY MAKE IT CRITICAL THAT
MOVEMENT TOWARD ARMS CONTROL BE ACHIEVED NOW. AND
BY NOW I MEAN, IN THE VERY IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THAT
IS IN ADDITION IMPORTANT, AS CONVEYED TO US BY
VARIOUS SOVIET OFFICIALS, BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW AN
IMPORTANT PARTY CONGRESS WILL TAKE PLACE IN
FEBRUARY, AT WHICH THE DIRECTION OF SOVIET
ECONOMIC PROGRAMS WILL BE SET FOR THE SUCCEEDING
FIVE YEARS. IN ALL, I WON'T REPEAT WHAT I'VE BEEN SAID
HERE, REGARDING MR. GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL DEMEANOR AND
PERFORMANCE. I GENERALLY SHARE THE VIEWS THAT HAVE BEEN
EXPRESSED BY MY COLLEAGUES. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Q: SEN. BYRD, NOW, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE'LL BE HAPPY
TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS. BEFORE WE BEGIN, LET ME SAY
THAT AT A LATER HOUR TODAY, HOPEFULLY NOT TOO LONG,
THE STATEMENT WHICH WAS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE, AND
WHICH WAS JOINED IN BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION,
BOTH REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS, WILL BE
MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS. I CAN'T IDENTIFY YOU
IF YOU'LL JUST TAKE THE FIRST MAN HERE, IF YOU HAVE
ANY PROBLEM WITH NAMES HERE, I'LL TRY TO HELP YOU.

Q: I'D LIKE TO ADDRESS A QUESTION TO ANY ONE OF THE
SENATORS. AMERICAN POLITICIANS HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT
SOVIET LEADERS CANNOT BE TRUSTED. DID YOU HAVE
THE FEELING AFTER YOUR MEETING TODAY THAT YOU COULD
TRUST MR. GORBACHEV, AND BY EXTENSION, IF YOU DO
FEEL THAT WAY, DOES THAT NOW MEAN THAT YOU CAN TRUST
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT?

A: (SEN. DARBANES): WELL, I DON'T THINK THAT WE PROCEED

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 08 OF 11 032010Z 0559 I03625

INFO LOG-00 /001 A2

ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 L/H-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 HSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 H0-06 L-03 PM-10
PA-02 DHE-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 SPD-01 DHPA-01 SDE-10 SART-01 /067 W

O 031911Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4465
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USIA FOR P/PE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BFAO ALLEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THAT BASIS
GORBACHEV HIMSELF TALKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF
VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO ARMS TREATIES AND STRESSED
THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO THAT, AND
OBVIOUSLY WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT AS WELL.
BUT THE SIMPLE FACT IS, IS THAT THE ISSUES THAT ARE
AT STAKE BETWEEN US ARE OF SUCH OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE
SINCE THAT WE BE THE WORLD'S TWO SUPERPOWERS AND WE
MUST TRY TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH ONE ANOTHER
TO SEE IF WE CAN REACH ACCOMMODATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO THOSE ISSUES. BUT THOSE ACCOMMODATIONS ARE REACHED
ON THE BASIS OF, AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY HIMSELF SAID,
HARD HEADED BUSINESSLIKE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE
ACCOMMODATIONS WOULD REST ON THAT PREMISE. I THINK
THE ASKING OF THAT QUESTION OR THE EMPHASIS ON IT
MISSES THE POINT. IT'S QUITE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TO
UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH DIMINISH
TENSIONS, IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP, MAKE A CONTRIBUTION
TOWARDS WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY, WITHOUT HAVING TO
ANSWER THAT QUESTION. AND I THINK THAT'S THE PREMISE
ON WHICH WE'VE BEEN PROCEEDING. I THINK IT'S THE
PREMISE ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS PROCEEDING.

Q: IT'S FOR SENATOR NUNN. YOU EXPRESSED ONE POSITIVE
AND TWO NEGATIVES BY THE TIME YOU WERE FINISHED.
SENATOR BYRD SEEMED A BIT MORE POSITIVE. AS AN EXPERT
ON ARMS, DID YOU SEE ANY REAL MOVEMENT IN WHAT
MR. GORBACHEV SAID, AND, BEYOND THAT, DO YOU THINK
THAT HE WAS TRYING TO OUTLINE A POSITION HE MIGHT
BRING TO THE SUMMIT RATHER THAN TO OUTLINE IT TO
YOU, SPECIFICALLY?

A: (SEN NUNN) WELL, I DON'T CONTEND WE HAD A
SUBSTANTIVE BREAKTHROUGH IN OUR CONVERSATION. I
DO BELIEVE THAT THE COMBINATION OF HIS RECENT INTERVIEW
PLUS THE AMPLIFICATION TODAY ON THE QUESTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH NOT BEING VERIFIABLE AND THEREFORE
EXPLICITLY NOT BEING PART OF ANY KIND OF PROHIBITION
WITHIN THE ABM TREATY, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THAT IS
A MOVEMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT THE CHALLENGE
IS TO GET THAT DEFINITION, AS NARROW AS IT IS, TO
THE TABLE IN GENEVA. AND THE SAME CAN BE SAID
ABOUT THE OFFENSIVE REFERENCES TO DRASTIC CUTS.

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 08 OF 11 032010Z 0559 I03362

I THINK THE SOVIET UNION IS MAKING A REAL MISTAKE
IN NOT TABLING A PROPOSAL DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY
REALLY ARE WILLING TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CUTS IN OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS AND IN INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS. IF THEY DO THAT
AND IF THEY ALSO DRAW THE LINE AS TO WHERE YOU DIVIDE
RESEARCH FROM TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT, AND IF THEY
ALSO CLARIFY FOR US THE CONCERNS WE HAVE ABOUT COMPLIANCE
WITH EXISTING TREATIES -- IF THEY DO THOSE THREE
THINGS, THEY WILL TEST THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. AND UNTIL THEY
DO THOSE THREE THINGS, I DON'T THINK THEY'RE IN A
POSITION TO TEST THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT, BECAUSE THEY
ARE NOT INTO THE SPIRIT OF THE SCHULTZ-GROMYKO
AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS TO DISCUSS ALL OF THESE THINGS
TOGETHER. AGAIN, UNLESS YOU DISCUSS OFFENSE AND
DEFENSE TOGETHER, WE WILL NOT REACH AN AGREEMENT.
THEIR CHALLENGE IS TO DISCUSS OFFENSE AND OUR
CHALLENGE IS TO BE WILLING, ONCE THEY HAVE TABLED
THEIR OFFENSE DISCUSSIONS AND POSITIONS, TO BE WILLING
TO HAVE A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE.

Q: SENATOR, CAN I JUST FOLLOW UP ON THAT BEFORE YOU
SIT DOWN? HOW MUCH PROGRESS THEN, HOW MUCH MOVEMENT
IN YOUR WORDS, WHAT IS THERE, REALLY, IF SOVIETS
SHOW SIGNS OF STICKING TO THIS NARROW DEFINITION
OF WHAT RESEARCH IS?

A: (SEN NUNN) WELL, ONE OF THE REAL PROBLEMS IS
THAT WE HAVE GOTTEN IN OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN
SOME PREVIOUS INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, WE HAVE GOTTEN
MUCH MORE IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE THAN OUR NEGOTIATORS
HAVE GOTTEN AT GENEVA IN FORMAL TALKS. GENEVA IS
WHERE WE HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THESE PROBLEMS.
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ARE NOT GOING TO SOLVE THE
FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. SO THE CHALLENGE IS TO TAKE
SOME OF THINGS THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAS SAID,

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 01 OF 11 032031Z 0960 3303626

INFO EUR-00 S-02 (W-01 /003 AA DCS

ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-01 L-03 PM-10
PA-02 DMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 INP-01
PRS-01 IPO-01 SAHA-01 SDEL-10 SART-01 /067 W

O 032031Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4466
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USIA FOR P/PE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BFAO/ALIN

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

(IN THE (INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE, AND ALSO THE
AMPLIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
IN OUR DIALOGUE AND PUT THOSE ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA
THEN I THINK IT WILL BE OUR TURN TO GIVE POSITIVE
RESPONSES.

Q: SENATOR, WASN'T THE AMERICAN RESEARCH ALREADY
EXCEEDED THE PARAMETERS OF THE LABORATORY THAT
GORBACHEV SET DOWN?

A: (SEN. BYRD:) COULD I, I KNOW WHO WALT ROGERS
IS, BUT COULD WE HAVE YOUR IDENTIFICATION ALSO
WHEN YOU ASK A QUESTION?

(SEN. Rumm:) WOULD YOU MIND REPEATING THAT, WALTER?

Q: SENATOR, WASN'T THE RESEARCH ON SDI ALREADY
EXCEEDED THE PARAMETERS BEYOND WHICH GORBACHEV
SAID HE'D BE WILLING TO TOLERATE, THAT IS, WASN'T
THE AMERICAN WORK ON STAR WARS GONE OUTSIDE THE
LABORATORY ALREADY?

A: (SEN. Rumm:) CERTAINLY, OUR PLANS FOR RESEARCH
[illegible]
MENTIONED, IF YOU TAKE HIS DEFINITION AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FROM IT, THEN HE IS SAYING YOU CAN
THINK IN A CLOSED LABORATORY, BUT YOU CAN'T DRAW
AND YOU CAN'T GO FURTHER THAN REALLY SIMPLY THINKING.
I DON'T THINK THAT DEFINITION IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. BUT I DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
VERY POSITIVE FOR THAT DEFINITION TO BE TABLED AS
A FORMAL POSITION IN GENEVA, AND THEN WE WOULD
RESPOND. SOMEWHERE AT SOME POINT IN TIME, AND I
THINK GENEVA'S THE PLACE, THE TWO SIDES HAVE TO
DRAW A LINE AS TO RESEARCH. IN MY VIEW, WE HAVE NOT
DONE THAT AS CAREFULLY AS WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO DO
IT. BUT THE WAY TO, TO USE THE WESTERN EXPRESSION,
SPOKE US OUT, IN TERMS OF OUR OWN DEFINITION, IS
FOR THEM TO TABLE THEIR DEFINITION, WHICH THEY HAVE
NOT DONE.

(SEN. WARNER:) I THINK A SUBSIDIARY QUESTION TO
THAT IS ON THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION. WE GAVE US

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 01 OF 11 032031Z 0960 3303626

THE IMPRESSION THAT THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS YOU COULD VERIFY EVERYTHING SHORT OF
WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE HUMAN MIND, AND THAT POINTS
OUT A SECOND AREA IN WHICH, IN MY JUDGEMENT, THERE'S
CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY OF VIEWPOINTS AT THIS TIME.

Q: THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS HAS NOT YET BEEN SET,
AND ALREADY WE HAVE MORE THAN ENOUGH ANALYSIS THAN
WE CAN STAND. TODAY WE HEARD SOME OF THE OBJECTIONS
OF THIS PANEL THAT HAS ONLY MET FOR PRELIMINARY TALKS.
DON'T YOU THINK THAT IN DISCUSSING THINGS LIKE THIS
AND IN VOICING YOUR OWN OBJECTIONS EVEN BEFORE THE
AGENDA IS SET, THAT IT MAY IN FACT SABOTAGE THE TALKS?

A: (SEN. BYRD:) LET ME SAY WITH REFERENCE TO THE
RUSSIAN LEADER'S DEFINITION OF RESEARCH. I THINK IT
IS TOO OFTEN OVERLOOKED, IT IS TOO OFTEN OVERLOOKED
THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE ENGAGING IN, AND HAVE
BEEN ENGAGING IN FOR A LONG TIME, RESEARCH IN CONNEC-
TION WITH GROUND AND SPACE BASED WEAPONS. THEY'VE
GOTTEN ALONG PRETTY FAR ON PARTICLE BEAM AND ON
LASER, RADIO FREQUENCY, KINETIC ENERGY AND SO ON.
THEY NEVER MENTION THAT, AND SO I WOULD SUGGEST,
AND I WOULD HOPE THAT SENATOR NUNN WOULD AGREE,
THAT IF WE GO ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION OF
MR. GORBACHEV, THERE'D HAVE TO BE SOME PULL BACKS
AND A LOWERING OF THE SCALE OF TESTING, ETC. ETC.,
ON THIS SAME THING, THOSE SAME INTERESTS, THOSE
SAME DEVELOPMENTS. NOW I'M SORRY, THE LADY WILL HAVE
TO ASK THE QUESTION AGAIN.

Q: MY QUESTION WAS WHETHER YOU FELT...

A: (SEN. SARBANES:) I THINK THE ANSWER TO YOUR
QUESTION IS NO. WE DON'T THINK THAT. WE THINK
THE EFFORTS WE'VE MADE WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMI

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 10 OF 11 032031Z 8961 SCI061?
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 IO-00 C:AE-00
DODE-00 NICE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-01 L-03 PM-10
PA-02 OMB-01 NRE-02 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SAM-01
PRS-01 SPC-01 IAPH-0. SOEL-10 SAM1-01 /067 W

O 032003Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA:FO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4467
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 10 OF 11 MOSCOW 12146

USIA:FO FOR P/PFE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADSHAW

E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

TOWARDS THE SUMMIT. WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO
GAIN A CLEARER PERCEPTION OF SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES,
THAT THAT CAN BE HELPFUL. I THINK WE ALL ATTACH
IMPORTANCE TO THE SUMMIT COMPARABLE TO THAT THE GENERAL
SECRETARY ATTACHED TO IT. I THINK THAT'S ONE OF THE
MESSAGES WE WILL TAKE HOME WITH US. SO, SIMPLY PUT,
I THINK THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS NO. WE THINK
THIS WILL BE A HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION
TOWARDS A POSITIVE SUMMIT WHICH WE REGARD AS A VERY
IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE

Q: ARE YOU ACTIVE IN THE FRAMING OF THE AGENDA, SIR?

A: (SEN. SARBANES): WELL, OF COURSE, THE FRAMING OF
THE AGENDA IS UNIQUELY A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S, SO I DON'T KNOW THAT I WOULD USE
THE TERM ACTIVELY INVOLVED. I THINK WE WILL SEEK
TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO IT, OBVIOUSLY WE WILL
REPORT ON OUR MEETING AND OUR IMPRESSIONS, BUT THE
NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT CARRIED ON BETWEEN THE CONGRESS
OR MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
SOVIET UNION. THEY BE CARRIED ON BY THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
SOVIET UNION.

Q: (SEN. BYRD): ANYONE ON THIS SIDE?

Q: I'D LIKE TO ASK SENATOR HUMM A QUESTION. HOW DID
THE GENERAL SECRETARY REACT TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT
WE TABLE A DEFINITION ON RESEARCH IN GENEVA?

A: (SEN. HUMM): I DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY
TO POSE THAT QUESTION DIRECTLY TO HIM IN THE
DIALOGUE TODAY. HE DID ADDRESS THAT IN GENERAL,
AND, AS I MENTIONED, IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE
SOVIETS STILL HAVE A PRE-CONDITION FOR SERIOUS
DISCUSSION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND INTERMEDIATE
WEAPONS, AND THAT PRE-CONDITION, IN MY OPINION,
IS THE EMPHASIS ON SOLVING THE STARS, THE SO-
CALLED STAR WARS QUESTIONS. IN MY OPINION
AGAIN, THAT IS A PRE-CONDITION, AND A PRE-CONDITION
THAT IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE GROMYKO-SHULTZ
ACCORD. I THINK BOTH SIDES HAVE TO BE WILLING TO

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 10 OF 11 032031Z 8961 SCI
DISCUSS OFFENCE AND DEFENSE, BUT I DID NOT
SPECIFICALLY POSE THAT QUESTION TO HIM. I DID
NOT HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY.

Q: COULD YOU TELL US, WITH, HOW MR. GORBACHEV REACTED
TO THE MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN?

A: (SEN. BYRD): HE SAID IT WAS A GOOD LETTER, AND
SMILED, AND INDICATED THAT HE THANKED THE PRESIDENT
AND ALSO THAT HE WISHED THAT WE WOULD CONVEY TO THE
PRESIDENT HIS BEST WISHES.

Q: DID HE READ IT ON THE SPOT?

A: (SEN. BYRD): HE READ IT RIGHT ON THE SPOT, HE
OPENED THE ENVELOPE, ON THE SPOT. THAT WAS BEFORE
WE GOT INTO THE DISCUSSIONS. ANYONE ELSE? THANK
YOU VERY MUCH. OH, I'M SORRY.

Q: (INAUDIBLE) ... THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS
RECENTLY STEPPED UP ITS CRITICISM ON THE SOVIET UNION'S
HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. RECENTLY THE SOVIET UNION POINTED
OUT TO SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ THAT THE U.S.'S
RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED.
WHAT, SPECIFICALLY, DO YOU AS SENATORS OF THE U.S.
PLAN TO TAKE BACK TO THE U.S. IN TERMS OF CORRECTING
THE U.S.'S OWN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS?

(SEN. BYRD): CAN WE HAVE YOUR NAME PLEASE?

MY NAME IS LENA SHERARD. (FROM.)

(SEN. BYRD): AND FROM WHAT ...?

I'M FROM THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK
JOURNALISTS.

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMI

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12145 11 OF 11 031021Z 0990 SC01629
--03 1711Z

INFO EUR-01 O-01 IM-01 083 A4 DCI

ACTION M-03

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ACS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 IO-00 C-AE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 ISO-00 HA-00 L-03 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 NRC-00 SCCA-02 USIE-00 SP-01 SAM-01
PRS-01 CPD-01 JAPN-01 /081 W
--171256 Z/12042Z /10 DA

O 031.0Z2Z SEP 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4468
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS SECTION 11 OF 11 MOSCOW 12145

USIA FOR P,PFE, PJRICE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H, EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BRADSHAW

T O 11356 N A
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER

A (SEN. BYRD): I THANK YOU. THE QUESTION HAS TO DO WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET LEADER'S RESPONSES. GEORGE?

(SEN. MITCHELL): THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S RESPONSE TODAY INCLUDED A STRONG STATEMENT ON DEFICIENCIES IN AMERICAN POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED SOUTH AFRICA AND CHILE, AMONG OTHERS. AND, YOUR QUESTION IS, I DIDN'T HEAR IT, WHAT WILL WE TAKE BACK TO THE UNITED STATES?

Q: WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WILL YOU MAKE TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ON CORRECTING ITS OWN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS? AND I DO MEAN INTERNAL TO THE U.S., NOT EXTERNAL.

A (SEN. MITCHELL): I'M NOT SURE WHAT INTERNAL ONES YOU'RE REFERRING TO, BUT THERE IS IN THE UNITED STATES A RATHER WIDESPREAD DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION, ON A VARIETY OF AREAS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA, SEVERAL OF US HERE HAVE TAKEN VIGOROUS EXCEPTION TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. ABSENT ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT SPECIFICALLY YOU WERE REFERRING TO, ABOUT INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS, I'M NOT ABLE TO RESPOND.

Q: SPECIFICALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP INTERROGATIONS, SURVEILLANCE, BY U.S. CITIZENS, BY THE CIA, STEPPED UP SURVEILLANCE AND HARRASSMENT BY THE FBI. CASES THAT HAVE BEEN FORMULATED WITH NO BASIS, PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL ON VERY VERY SPECIOUS GROUNDS, ETCETERA, ETCETERA.

A: (SEN. MITCHELL): WELL, I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE ETCETERA, ETCETERA, BUT I'LL SAY THOSE ITEMS YOU'VE IDENTIFIED HAVE NO BASIS. I'VE SPENT MOST OF MY ADULT LIFE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, AND, WHILE IT IS IMPERFECT, I CHALLENGE YOU TO FIND ANY SYSTEM THAT IS MORE RESPONSIVE AND MORE APPROPRIATE, MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS. THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PLACE TO MAKE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12146 11 OF 11 031031Z 0990 SC
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT I'D BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THAT WITH YOU ANYTIME. WITH RESPECT TO SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS BY THE CIA, THERE'S NO BASIS FOR THAT. THERE'S NO BASIS FOR THE OTHER ALLEGATIONS. CONES

ALERT COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX H

Test of Senate Resolution 227, Urging A Joint United States—Soviet Effort to Achieve Worldwide Disease Immunization by 1990 (Approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 24, 1985)

Senate Resolution 227—Urging A Joint United States-Soviet Effort to Achieve Worldwide Disease Immunization by 1990

Whereas six diseases—measles, diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, tuberculosis, and polio—each year ravage the children of the world, killing some 5,000,000 and leaving an equal number disabled;

Whereas the medical technology now exists to immunize the world's children against these diseases at an estimated cost of $5 per child—a total cost of $500 million for the 100 million children born in the developing countries each year;

Whereas medical studies estimate that such immunization could reduce child mortality around the world by as much as one-half;

Whereas reduced child mortality is crucial to attaining levels of economic development associated with reduced population growth;

Whereas in the 1960's and 1970's the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated effectively together and with other nations in a United Nations program which, by 1980, ended the scourge of smallpox throughout the world;

Whereas responsible scientists now believe that a concerted international program could achieve immunization of all children on earth against all major diseases by 1990; and

Whereas recent international efforts to assist the famine-stricken people of Africa demonstrate a powerful impulse among the people of the developed nations to direct resources toward people less fortunate;

Now, Therefore, be it

Resolved,

(1) That the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately undertake a formal commitment to initiate, using their own resources and those of other donors and appropriate multilateral agencies, a joint effort to bring the benefits of immunization to all children of the world by the year 1990.

(2) That this joint world immunization effort should be undertaken in a spirit of common dedication to a transcending humanitarian purpose, and with the practical hope that such constructive collaboration may also serve as a model for further superpower cooperation.

○